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Justice for All: Pro Bono Publico and the Rule of Law
less widespread and urgent when compared to Hong 
Kong. Perhaps that is a refl ection of our long cultivated 
pragmatism. 
Many consider the Rule of Law to be multi-faceted. Lord 
Neuberger, President of the UK Supreme Court, said in the 
2013 Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture, that the Rule of Law 
“can mean different things”, of which “affordable justice” is 
one aspect.
At our own OLY this year, all three speeches contained this 
common thread – access to justice, and more importantly, 
the idea that access to justice is an integral component, or 
practical manifestation of the Rule of Law. This is where life 
is breathed into theory, where the rubber meets the road.
It also resonates with the views adopted in the United 
Nations Sixth (Legal) Committee deliberations last year, 
where it was almost universally accepted that access to 
justice must be ensured if a society was to be truly based 
on the Rule of Law. A just society must allow each member 
in that community to enjoy or be protected by his or her 
legal rights. It is one where even the most marginalised is 
not deprived of their legal rights. In our system of laws, and 
in the context of a free market economy, access to justice 
means affordable justice, which means affordable private 
lawyers to defend or fi ght for a client’s rights. However, it 
is inescapable that there will be some, even many, who 
simply cannot afford us. If that is the case, then we admit 
two concurrent systems of justice in our nation, one system 
for those who can afford lawyers, and no real justice for 
those that cannot. Therein lies the gap.
This gap is ameliorated in part by the provision of free legal 
services. But who stands in the gap?  It is us, the practising 
Bar. Some will ask, why should we undertake this? Why not 
call for the Government to provide even more legal aid, or 
set up a public defender’s offi ce? Or both? 
Without wading into a policy or political debate, permit me 
to offer a more existential reason from Ethics and the Legal 
Profession by Davis and Elliston (editors), which was cited 
with approval by our Court of Appeal in Lim Mey Lee Susan 
v Singapore Medical Council [2013]SGHC122:
This is Singapore’s Jubilee year, and for us lawyers, 
2015 signals another milestone, the 800th anniversary of 
the signing of the Magna Carta at Runnymede. Over the 
centuries, the Magna Carta has come to be seen as the 
symbolic beginning of the Rule of Law.
I attended the Hong Kong Opening of the Legal Year last 
month, where I witnessed, with fascination, a debate on 
the Rule of Law unfurl with every speech made. No doubt 
impelled by the “Umbrella Movement”, their Chief Justice, 
Secretary of Justice, Bar Association Chairman, and the 
Law Society President, all contemplated the Rule of Law, its 
meaning and scope.
The debate, while not framed in these terms, considered the 
competing notions of whether a “thin” or “thick” conception 
of the Rule of Law applied. The former focuses on strict 
adherence to the law, due process according to law, and 
respecting the orders and decision of the Courts. The 
“thick” conception found its champion in the Bar Association 
Chairman, Paul Shieh SC, who in an excoriating rejoinder 
to the Secretary Of Justice said:
  First, as we all know, Rule of Law means far more than 
just blind adherence to laws - respect of an independent 
judiciary, the need to ensure minimum contents in laws 
in terms of human rights protection, respect for the rights 
and liberty of the individual when law enforcers exercise 
their discretionary powers are examples of requirements 
of Rule of Law which go beyond just obeying the law.  In 
fact it can be said that over-emphasis on the ‘obey the 
law’ aspect of ‘Rule of Law’ is a hallmark of a regime 
which is keen on using the law as a tool to constrain the 
governed, rather than as a means to constrain the way 
it governs.
Singapore too, is a nation that views the Rule of Law as 
foundational to both its past and future success. We too, 
grapple with how thin or thick the Rule of Law is, or ought to 
be. These are important doctrines, for theory fi nds its way 
into practice, and any discussion of this, while essential, is 
inherently controversial (and perhaps best left for another 
Gazette piece!). These are still live issues in Singapore, 
as they should be for any civilised society; but for now, the 
debate is sporadic (though no less intense!), and certainly 
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  To practice a profession is, it is often said, not to pursue 
a ‘mere money-making calling’.  To organise as a 
profession is to undertake more than serving oneself. 
There must, in addition (or instead), be a commitment 
to the good of others - clients, patients, parishioners, or 
the like - even when carrying out that commitment does 
not benefi t those who practice the art. The members of 
some professions must, for example, be ready to help 
those who cannot afford to pay ... To be a member of 
a profession is to declare oneself to be someone 
of whom more than ordinary good conduct may 
properly be expected” (emphasis added).
To act pro bono publico is at the core of our status as 
professionals. Pro bono transcends lawyers and the legal 
sphere. The Rule of Law is foundational to our community. 
Access to justice is critical to the Rule of Law. An effective 
pro bono regime is civil society at work, and can ensure 
adequate access to justice. It is a positive externality, a 
common good, which nourishes our larger community. And 
like every common good, it can only survive and fl ourish 
if someone takes ownership of it. That “someone” is, and 
has to be us, the profession. Here, both duty and privilege 
converge to engage the “better angels of our nature”.
Take it one step further. We live in a meritocracy. The way 
our social and economic system is structured, if you are a 
lawyer, you have a fortiori, ascended near the peak of the 
meritocratic pile. But meritocracy, as an organising system, 
is only moral and legitimate if those that benefi t the most 
from it, make it better for those who have not.  
We have many pro bono heroes. Exceptional they may be, 
but there are human limits to their reach. Their role must be 
to inspire us, to make the exceptional, commonplace. As a 
profession, let us collectively aspire to make a difference 
that will shape the heart of our community. There are over 
6,000 lawyers practising in domestic and foreign fi rms. If 
5,000 lawyers each did 25 hours of pro bono work a year, 
that totals 125,000 hours of free legal service. If we take an 
average charge out rate of $400 per hour, that is an annual 
$50 million contribution to the community. And that doesn’t 
count committee or other charitable work outside the law. 
We can make a difference.  
Lawyers not only contribute time, we contribute cash. The 
recent Just Walk on 10 January 2015 raised over $2 million, 
the bulk of the donations coming from the legal sector. This 
event was a game changer, as it exponentially raised the 
level of awareness and engagement in respect of our pro 
bono services. It was incredible to see the different parts of 
the legal community come together in support of a common 
cause. Practitioners, the judiciary, the legal service, students 
and academia; they all took part. They as stakeholders 
truly walked the walk. The participation by members of the 
Attorney-General’s Chambers was remarkable in its symbolic 
value. In their day jobs, prosecutors are adversaries to 
defence counsel. They are the opponents that the criminal 
Bar try to outwit, outplay and outlast. Not so on 10 January, 
where we walked in solidarity to raise funds for pro bono 
services. This was a visible and tangible reminder of our 
common goal, that we are all ultimately servants of the Rule 
of Law, that our aims are ultimately the same, that justice be 
done in all cases. It is an express recognition – justice is only 
truly authentic when accused persons are responsibly and 
competently represented by effective and robust defence 
lawyers. 
Our response to engaging in pro bono work must be 
individual, and collective. It is the profession’s corporate 
social responsibility. We all have to pull our weight but the 
prognosis is good; we are all gradually leaning in the same 
direction. For many years, the pro bono burden has fallen 
disproportionately on small fi rms, sole proprietors, and 
our individual outliers. That is changing. For example, this 
year, the CLAS fellowship scheme kicks off. This is only 
possible because of signifi cant contributions from the fi ve 
largest domestic fi rms. Other medium and large fi rms have 
also pledged to undertake a minimum number of pro bono 
cases. This is a great start, and a catalyst for change. Our 
challenge is to create a sustainable pro bono eco-system 
and embed this into every individual lawyer’s DNA. The 
sum of our individual contributions, albeit small, translates 
into the collective response of the profession. If we dare to 
aspire, and do this right, we can say to our community – 
“you can count on us, we are here for you”, and contribute to 
the development of a gracious and compassionate society, 
where there is truly, Justice for All.
► Thio Shen Yi, Senior Counsel
 President
 The Law Society of Singapore
Continued from page 1
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Upcoming Events
Council and Committee Update
5 March 2015
Lunar New Year Luncheon 
13 March 2015
Small Law Firms Committee Luncheon
16 &17 March 2015
Litigation Conference 2015
30 April to 2 May 2015
Bench & Bar Games 2015
Ongoing till August 2015
CLAS Criminal Law Training Programme
Diary
10 January 2015
Just Walk
30 January 2015
Seminar on Arbitration in Islamic Finance
9.30am -11.30am
55 Market Street
Proposed SG50 Activities
The Society is planning to organise several activities in 
the areas of continuing professional development, law 
awareness and possibly a lecture to mark Singapore’s 
50th anniversary this year. Details will be released in due 
course. 
CLAS Criminal Law Training Programme
The Criminal Legal Aid Scheme (“CLAS”) launched its 
inaugural Criminal Law Training Programme on 8 January 
2015. The Programme consists of 31 modules on various 
criminal law topics delivered by senior practitioners and 
academics. The Programme includes lessons at varying 
levels of complexity to cater to practitioners at all levels 
of seniority and with a view to substantially progressing 
a junior practitioner's competence in criminal practice at 
an accelerated rate. Details of the various modules are 
available at the Society’s website. 
Foreign Practitioners Committee
Council resolved to form a Foreign Practitioners 
Committee to address issues concerning foreign lawyers 
in Singapore. 
Members of Standing Committees 2015
Council approved the members of the majority of the 
standing committees for 2015. 
Luncheon for Small Law Firm Practitioners
The Small Law Firms Committee and the State Courts 
Committee jointly organised a luncheon for members 
from small law fi rms on 14 January 2015 to discuss latest 
practice developments. 
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Diary and Upcoming Events
From the Desk of the CEO
The Committees of the Law Society have been busy in 
January formulating their work plans and budgets for 
2015. The work plans set out the proposed initiatives and 
projects of each Committee for the year, supported by the 
Secretariat.
This month, I will be highlighting the work of our Committees 
in the Continuing Professional Development (“CPD”) space. 
The Society’s CPD programmes are shaped primarily by our 
CPD Committee and the respective practice committees.
Based on the CPD work plan for 2015, I am pleased to report 
that a full suite of CPD events has been planned, covering a 
wide breadth of practice areas and deep diving into certain 
selected topics. A few of our key programmes for 2015 are 
highlighted below. We look forward to welcoming you at our 
CPD events.
The Law Society continues to be a key provider of 
continuing professional development programmes for legal 
professionals in Singapore. We provide practice-oriented 
programmes which are aimed at helping legal professionals 
acquire and maintain professional competence in core 
areas of practice and to keep up with the latest legal 
developments and emerging areas of practice.
Litigation Conference (16-17 March 2015)
The Litigation Conference 2015 is proudly presented by the 
Society’s Civil Practice Committee. The two-day Conference 
aims to bring together the judiciary, senior practitioners and 
industry experts across various jurisdictions to provide fresh 
insight on the latest developments in this area of practice.
The theme for the Conference in 2015 is International 
Commercial Litigation, leveraging on the much anticipated 
launch of the Singapore International Commercial Court 
(“SICC”). International speakers have been invited to speak 
and take part in an exchange of ideas which would benefi t 
international commercial litigation and, by extension, the 
SICC. The Conference is accredited with 12 Public CPD 
points for the full Conference with six Public CPD points for 
each day of the Conference.
Th e CLAS Criminal Law Training Programme 
(January-August 2015)
In line with the Enhanced CLAS framework in 2015, the 
Criminal Law Training Programme (the “Programme”) will 
serve CLAS Fellows, active CLAS volunteers and other 
practitioners wishing to develop or improve their criminal 
practice knowledge and skills. Free or subsidised access to 
the various lessons will be made available to active CLAS 
volunteers. 
The Programme will include modules at varying levels 
of complexity to cater to practitioners at all levels of 
seniority and with a view to substantially progressing a 
junior practitioner’s competence in criminal practice at 
an accelerated rate. Practitioners will be able to sign up 
for the entire Programme as a stand-alone package at a 
discounted rate. The Programme is CPD accredited and the 
Programme’s total CPD value is 46.5 public CPD points.
e-Learning Seminars (On-going)
The Law Society’s online training courses provide fl exibility 
in allowing you to learn where and when your busy schedule 
allows. Registration is on-going for our Online Learning 
Programmes. Access streaming video content compatible 
with your computer (PC or Mac), iPhone, iPad, Android and 
other devices. 
Our popular online courses include Demystifying Financial 
Statements, Continuous Probate Procedures, Drafting 
of Wills, Trust Litigation, and Insurance Fraud in Motor 
Accident Claims. Private CPD points are claimable by 
lawyers for registering and viewing of online courses.
More details are available at http://www.lawsoc.org.sg/en-
gb/elearning.aspx. 
► Tan Su-Yin  
 Chief Executive Officer
 The Law Society of Singapore
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Sentencing Conference 2014
9 October 2014
Opening Address by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon*
Distinguished Guests
Ladies and Gentlemen
I. Introduction
1.  It gives me great pleasure to welcome our foreign 
visitors to Singapore and all of you to this year’s 
Sentencing Conference. The idea for this conference 
was mooted in 2011 and what began as a discussion 
essentially amongst the various domestic stakeholders 
has since grown to feature the participation of eminent 
speakers from various parts of the Commonwealth. 
I am delighted to welcome the Honourable Wayne 
Stewart Martin, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the Western Australia as well as Sir Anthony Hooper, 
who while still practising at the Bar led me in a case 
more than 20 years ago and who until quite recently 
served on the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. 
Chief Justice Martin and Sir Anthony are but two of the 
distinguished speakers who have graciously agreed to 
participate in this Conference.
  
2.  This year’s conference is themed “Trends, Tools and 
Technology”. On the issue of technology, there are 
exciting developments in the State Courts pertaining to 
the Sentencing Information and Research Repository. 
This is a sentencing database of the results of cases 
prosecuted in the State Courts and selected sentencing 
factors associated with each case will also be captured 
in this database.2 This development will help the 
Courts, the Prosecution and the Defence Bar access 
the precedents that may have a bearing on each case. 
I am sure we will hear and perhaps see more of this in 
the course of the next two days.
3.  I have been invited to deliver the Opening Address 
this morning and I thought I would begin by speaking 
about the function and importance of sentencing in the 
criminal justice system. I then suggest some ways in 
which we could improve and enhance our sentencing 
practices so as to better ensure that the punishment 
imposed fi ts the offence and the offender. I close with a 
reminder of the need for us to look beyond sentencing 
to eventually reintegrating ex-offenders into our society.
II. Th e Function of Crime and Punishment
4.  In the criminal justice system, the law usually provides 
that an offender must be punished. The main strands of 
thought that explain the basis or the underlying reason for 
punishment are retribution, deterrence, prevention and 
rehabilitation. The retributivist believes that free-willed 
individuals must be held morally responsible for their 
actions; and that this is best done by ensuring that they 
are proportionately sanctioned for offending behaviour. 
The utilitarian considers that punishment is justifi ed 
because it ought to have a salutary deterrent effect: 
the pain of punishment and the costs of imposing that 
pain upon the offender are thought to be outweighed by 
the social benefi ts that may consequently be enjoyed. 
Furthermore, punishment might also have a specifi c 
deterrent effect in deterring that offender from repeating 
the offending behaviour having regard to his character, 
history and circumstances. 
 
5.  Then there is rehabilitation. Discarding the notions of 
criminal responsibility and proportionate punishment, 
proponents scrutinise the moral, mental and physical 
characteristics of offenders with the aim of setting right 
aspects of the offender’s character and propensities 
that have disposed him to crime, so that he may be 
speedily reintegrated into mainstream society. 
6.  Lastly, punishment may also be justifi ed on the ground 
of incapacitation, or prevention. Unlike reformation 
or deterrence, incapacitation is directed simply at 
restricting the offender’s liberty, movements or capacity 
to do wrong because it is in the public interest that further 
harm does not occur at the hands of this offender. 
 
7.  The interplay of these theories or justifi cations will differ 
according to the circumstances of the offenders as well 
as of the offences.3 The rationale behind a probation 
order directed at a young offender will plainly be very 
different from that behind a long period of preventive 
detention for a recalcitrant one even where the two may 
have engaged in offending behaviour that might, at least 
on the surface, appear to be identical. Punishment is, 
therefore, very much a social construct that cannot exist 
in a vacuum. Theories of punishment can inform the 
08
News
Singapore Law Gazette   February 2015
Address by the Chief Justice
Court’s decision on an appropriate punitive response to 
the offender in the precise circumstances of his offence. 
The sentencing Court should generally be concerned 
with two questions when deciding on the appropriate 
sentence: what is it seeking to achieve by punishing 
this offender; and secondly, how should it punish the 
offender so as to best achieve that goal? The fi rst 
question attempts to identify a general justifying aim; 
while the second question seeks to calibrate the form 
and the severity of punishment with this justifying aim 
in mind.4 There are of course other considerations such 
as consistency with the precedents which aims for 
overall fairness and parity in the treatment of offenders 
across the penal system as a whole. The two questions 
I have outlined are aimed directly at ensuring that 
the punishment fi ts the crime, in the sense that it is 
appropriate to the offence and the offender.
III. Principles of Sentencing 
8.  To aid sentencing Judges in responding appropriately to 
these questions, a number of sentencing principles can 
be distilled from our precedents. I propose this morning 
to recount some of the more important of these. First, 
our criminal law, for practical purposes, is entirely the 
product of legislation. Hence, the punishment imposed 
by the Courts should generally be informed by the 
relevant legislative purpose. For example, a driving 
disqualifi cation order seeks to punish and deter certain 
types of offensive driving behaviour and also to protect 
the public from the risk of harm occasioned by the 
bad or antisocial driving of others. In the context of 
disqualifi cation orders for driving under the infl uence 
of alcohol, it would seem to follow that the greater the 
margin by which the driver’s blood alcohol limit exceeds 
the prescribed or permitted limit, the longer should be 
the period of time for which he is disqualifi ed; likewise, 
if by reason of these circumstances, damage or injury 
was caused to others. 
9  What might well not be a factor that affects the length 
of the disqualifi cation order could be the belligerent 
conduct of the offender upon apprehension, although 
that would likely be a factor that warrants substantially 
increasing the fi ne imposed or imposing a term of 
imprisonment. This is how I put it in Edwin s/o Suse 
Nathen v Public Prosecutor (“Suse Nathen”) 5 at [32]:
   I accept that belligerent ... conduct upon 
apprehension is yet another type of aggravating 
factor that may justify an increased fi ne or – in 
exceptional cases – imprisonment. But such 
conduct would not ordinarily affect the length of 
the disqualifi cation order as it bears only a minimal 
relation to the rationale behind the imposition of a 
disqualifi cation order. To put it another way, such 
conduct has no bearing in itself on the dangers 
to road users which is what the offence and in 
particular the disqualifi cation order is generally 
meant to address.
  The point ultimately is that the sentencing Judge, by 
paying close attention to the object of the statute, which 
creates the offence and prescribes the punishment, will 
often be guided as to how best the offender should be 
punished in order to further that object; and by so doing, 
the Judge will less likely be coloured by factors, which 
might in fact be tangential to what ought really to be the 
primary sentencing considerations.
10.  Additionally, the legislation will also reveal Parliament’s 
views as to the gravity of the offence as refl ected in the 
range of sentences that will have been legislated and 
in particular, in the maximum or minimum sentences 
that may be imposed. The Court’s role is to ensure that 
the full spectrum of sentences enacted by Parliament 
is carefully explored in determining the appropriate 
sentence in the case at hand.6 In Poh Boon Kiat v 
Public Prosecutor (“Poh Boon Kiat”),7 it was noted that 
in relation to individual vice-related offences, the full 
range of sentences prescribed by Parliament had not 
commonly been used as refl ected in the precedents, 
and that it was incumbent on the sentencing Judge to 
note the available range and apply his mind to precisely 
where the offender’s conduct fell within that range.8 
This is important if the Courts are in fact going to give 
effect to Parliament’s intention.
11.  Second, the sentence must be proportionate. A basic 
tenet of a just punishment is that the sentence be 
proportionate to the severity of the offence committed 
as well as the moral and legal culpability of the offender. 
In Mohamed Shouffee bin Adam v Public Prosecutor9 
(“Shouffee”), this was elaborated on in the specifi c 
context of aggregating sentences. The facts of the case 
bear recounting. The accused was driving through the 
Woodlands Checkpoint in Singapore when he was 
stopped and searched. Packets of crystalline substance 
were found in various parts of his car. The accused 
was charged with the importation, possession and 
consumption of various drugs and he pleaded guilty. He 
had a string of previous convictions, all of which were 
for drug related offences. But one especially notable 
feature of this offender’s criminal history that was not 
picked up at fi rst instance was that he had remained 
crime- (and presumptively, drug-) free for a period of 
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nine years immediately prior to the latest charges. He 
was sentenced below to an aggregate term of 17 years’ 
imprisonment as a consequence of the Judge choosing 
the two heaviest sentences out of the four possible 
ones to run consecutively. 
12.  Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court is 
obliged in certain circumstances to impose at least two 
consecutive sentences.10 Sentencing Judges have felt 
from time to time that this statutory imposition can impede 
their ability to impose a justly proportionate sentence. 
If true, this would be a concern because justice is 
undermined when a Judge with a sentencing discretion 
is constrained despite this to impose an aggregate 
sentence that on the whole, is disproportionate, in his 
judgment, to the circumstances of the offence. Two 
main principles guide the Court in the specifi c context 
of dealing with aggregating multiple sentences: the 
one transaction rule and totality principle. There are 
also subsidiary rules. Thus, for instance when each 
sentence has already been calibrated to take account 
of the aggravating factors relevant to each charge, 
those factors should not feature again in directing the 
Court to select harsher individual sentences to run 
consecutively. But I wish to elaborate on the two primary 
rules.
  
13.  The one-transaction rule is an evaluative rule directed 
at fi ltering out those sentences that should not usually 
be ordered to run consecutively because otherwise, 
the offender might end up being doubly punished for 
offences that have been committed simultaneously 
or so close together and that invade the same legally 
protected interest, that in truth, they constitute a single 
transaction. Even then, as I noted in Shouffee, there 
may be exceptions.11
14.  The totality principle is a principle of limitation 
concerned with ensuring that the aggregate sentence 
is proportionate to the overall criminality of the case.12 
This is an important consideration because the overall 
sentence may be crushing in all the circumstances if 
the totality principle were not carefully considered. In 
Shouffee, I said as follows:13
   The totality principle is a consideration that is 
applied at the end of the sentencing process. … 
[It] requires the court to take a “last look” at all the 
facts and circumstances and assess whether the 
sentence looks wrong ...
 
   If so, consideration ought to be given to whether the 
aggregate sentence should be reduced. This may 
of course be done by re-assessing which of the 
appropriate sentences ought to run consecutively 
... In addition ... it could also be done by re-
calibrating the individual sentences so as to arrive 
at an appropriate aggregate sentence.
  …
   The power of the court to recalibrate the discrete 
sentences when these are ordered to run 
consecutively arises from the common law principle 
of proportionality, to which I have already referred. 
It is unquestionably true that a sentencing judge 
must exercise his sentencing discretion with due 
regard to considerations of proportionality when 
considering any given case. If this is valid and 
applicable when sentencing a single offender to 
a single sentence of imprisonment, then I cannot 
see how it can cease to be so when the sentencing 
judge is required in the exercise of his sentencing 
discretion to impose an aggregate sentence for a 
number of offences. … 
15.  I have recounted this at some length because 
there is a danger that proportionality can become a 
convenient expression that sounds good but is shorn 
of real meaning if Judges and counsel fail to exercise 
care in what may often seem to be a routine task of 
selecting which among several sentences should run 
consecutively. For this reason, in Shouffee I laid down a 
sentencing framework for fi rst instance Judges to apply 
when aggregating sentence as follows:14
 a.  As a general rule, the sentencing Judge should 
exclude any offences, which though distinct … 
nonetheless form part of a single transaction. As I 
have noted above, this yields a provisional exclusion 
because there may be circumstances where the 
sentencing Judge may feel that it is necessary to 
depart from this rule.
 b.  ... the sentencing Judge should then consider which 
of the available sentences should run consecutively.
 c.  The sentencing Judge should ensure that the 
cumulative sentence is longer than the longest 
individual sentence.
 d.  Beyond this, the consideration of which sentences 
should run consecutively is likely to be a multi-
factorial consideration in which the Court assesses 
what would be a proportionate and adequate 
aggregate sentence having regard to the totality of 
the criminal behaviour of the offender.
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 e.  ... It is important that while the sentencing Judge 
seeks to ensure that he has taken due regard of 
the overall criminality of the accused, he does not 
... “re-input an aggravating consideration at [this] 
stage, if [that] has already been fully factored into 
the sentencing equation during the fi rst stage”.
 f.  ... the sentencing Judge must be careful not to have 
regard to any matters which are not the subject of a 
conviction or which the accused has not consented 
to being taken into consideration.
 g.  The sentencing Judge should then apply the totality 
principle ... by choosing different sentences or 
recalibrating sentences if this seems warranted. 
 h.  In exceptional cases, the sentencing Judge may 
consider imposing more than two sentences 
consecutively. This may be appropriate in such 
circumstances as where the accused is shown to 
be a persistent or habitual offender, where there 
are extraordinary cumulative aggravating factors, 
or where there is a particular public interest.
16.  For Shouffee, the application of this framework was the 
difference between a term of 17 years’ imprisonment at 
fi rst instance and a term of imprisonment of 12 years 
and 6 months on appeal.
17.  A third principle is that like cases should be treated 
alike. Common factual situations provide a basis for 
a corresponding pattern of sentences, which can then 
be adjusted to accord with the detailed variations of 
particular cases.15 Although sentencing is a matter 
of discretion, that discretion is never to be exercised 
arbitrarily. Broad consistency in sentencing also 
provides society with a clear understanding of what and 
how the law seeks to punish and allows for members 
of society to have regard to this in arranging their own 
affairs and making their own choices. 
18.  Fourth, the characteristics of the offender and 
circumstances of the offence will often have a bearing 
on sentencing. Given that the circumstances of two 
offences will not be identical, and therefore, due 
consideration and weight must be given to these 
matters so that the punishment can be tailored to the 
individual. This in turn ties in with the fi fth principle, 
which is that alternative forms of punishment should 
be considered where applicable. A common example is 
when considerations of rehabilitation come to the fore 
as is often the case with youthful offenders. The idea is 
that the offender at this stage will stand a much better 
chance of reform and rehabilitation; and if punishment 
is selected with this end in mind, the chances of 
preventing a recurrence of offending behaviour is likely 
to be enhanced and maximised.  
19.  I suggest that, in any given case, the sentencing Judge 
would do well to bear in mind these guiding principles 
when selecting the appropriate punishment. Sentencing 
in our system is not mechanistic or formulaic. In the 
United States, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
devised to guide the federal sentencing Court within 
indicative ranges. These Guidelines operate largely as 
a grid of interconnected factors including in particular 
the conduct involved, the offence level with which the 
offender has been charged with, and the criminal history 
of the offender. Admittedly there is some, albeit modest, 
room to depart to take account of circumstances. The 
Guidelines emerged as a response to the sense that 
the Courts were exercising sentencing discretion in 
varying and even disparate ways and their aim was 
to reduce the unpredictability that was engendered 
as a result. But criticisms have been levelled at their 
rigidity and harshness towards certain offences and 
offenders, even while their effectiveness in reducing 
unpredictability remains debated.16 The question 
whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have 
or have not met their intended purpose is much less 
important to the present discussion than is the fact that 
in our system, Judges have the opportunity and indeed 
the duty to take due account of all the circumstances in 
selecting an appropriate sentence. 
IV. Providing Reasons in Sentencing 
20.  This brings me to the next point and that is the giving of 
reasons when sentencing. The legislation will in most 
instances provide for judicial discretion in sentencing. 
But this is not an unfettered discretion. Courts are 
accountable for their sentencing decisions and it is, 
therefore, incumbent on Judges to explain, at least in 
brief terms, the reasons that underlie the sentencing 
decision. 
21.  The judicial duty to give reasons is not a new concept. 
Lord Denning once observed that “[i]n order that a trial 
should be fair, it is necessary, not only that a correct 
decision should be reached, but also that it should be 
seen to be based on reason; and that can only be seen, 
if the judge states his reasons”.17  The duty has been 
recognised by our Courts in a number of authorities,18 
though of course, it should not be overlooked that the 
degree of detail in which the reasons are explained 
should correspond to that which is necessary to meet 
the requirements of a particular case.19  
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22.  Judicial reasoning is all the more important in criminal 
cases because personal liberties are affected. In 
general, these reasons should be prepared and 
delivered with a number of objectives including these in 
particular: 
 a.  To enable the accused to understand the basis 
upon which the Judge convicted and sentenced 
him;
 b.  To signal sentencing trends to all stakeholders 
including the Prosecution, the Defence Bar and, 
ultimately, the public;
 c.  To refl ect the due consideration of the issues by the 
Judge and to assure the legitimacy of the judiciary 
in the eyes of the public. This is how the point was 
put in R v Sheppard:20
 d.  Decisions on individual cases are neither submitted 
to nor blessed at the ballot box. The Courts attract 
public support or criticism at least in part by the 
quality of their reasons. If unexpressed, the judged 
are prevented from judging the Judges.
 e.  To enable an appellate court to understand the 
Judge’s decision with a view to determining whether 
in all the circumstances, appellate intervention is 
warranted;21 and 
 f.  To guide future Courts when sentencing offenders 
for similar offences. Where the Judge’s reasons for 
imposing a particular sentence are not made known, 
it may not be safe to rely on that as a precedent. 
Moreover in such circumstances, the sentencing 
Judge relying on the decision might lose sight of 
the particular facts and circumstances which are of 
the fi rst importance in sentencing.22 
23.  Where appellate Judges are concerned, the last of the 
factors noted above assumes particular importance. 
It must be noted that the State Courts deal with the 
signifi cant majority of criminal cases in Singapore. In 
the small proportion of cases that come on appeal, 
among the primary functions of the appellate Judge is 
to provide guidance and clarity in sentencing law and 
practice. Appellate Judges have the duty to consider 
and resolve with reasoned judgments, incongruent, 
contradictory or uneven sentencing precedents and 
practices. This was the approach taken, for instance, 
in Edwin s/o Suse Nathen23 in relation to the offence 
of driving when intoxicated; in Yap Ah Lai v Public 
Prosecutor (“Yap Ah Lai”)24 in relation to the offence 
of importing duly unpaid tobacco products; and, most 
recently, in Poh Boon Kiat25 in relation to vice-related 
offences.
 
24.  In recent months, the decisions of the appellate courts 
have also clarifi ed the position in relation to the relatively 
straightforward matter of the treatment of aggravating 
and mitigating factors. At one level, this might seem to 
be the most basic of considerations for counsel as well 
as for sentencing Judges. Yet, the following seemingly 
obvious aspects of how these should be dealt with have 
had to be clarifi ed:
 a.  That the absence of an aggravating factor is neutral 
to sentencing and cannot be equated with or treated 
as a mitigating factor;26 
 b.  That offence-specifi c aggravating and mitigating 
factors should be identifi ed by the courts and these 
will generally even if not invariably be linked to the 
rationale of sentencing that applies in relation to 
that particular offence;27 and  
 c.  As I have already mentioned, that care must be 
taken to avoid double-counting aggravating factors 
or taking factors that are already inherent in the 
defi nition of the offence as an aggravating aspect 
of the offence.28 
V. Sentencing Guidelines
25.  I have touched on the important role that appellate courts 
play by laying down sentencing guidelines. But it would 
be useful to make some brief observations as to how 
these may best be used. As the very name suggests, 
these are meant to provide guidance and indicative 
benchmarks for sentences. The primary object is to 
provide a degree of predictability as well as to achieve 
some measure of consistency so that like cases are 
treated alike. The sentencing guidelines can also help 
to ensure that the full range of sentencing options is 
utilised by sentencing Judges. But we must remember 
that these guidelines are no more than a judicial creation 
designed to aid the sentencing Judge in the discharge 
of his functions. While seeking to achieve consistency 
in sentencing, a key element that will always underlie 
the use of these guidelines is the fl exibility with which 
they must be applied so as to achieve the just outcome 
in each case.
26.  It virtually goes without saying that neither the guidelines 
and benchmarks in general nor the suggested ranges 
usually contained within them, can be regarded as 
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rigid or impermeable. They certainly cannot operate as 
a tally sheet to be unthinkingly applied by sentencing 
Courts. Indeed, this must follow even from the simple 
fact that these guidelines do not and cannot encompass 
every conceivable fact or consideration that may bear 
on the sentencing calculus. For example, the drink-
driving benchmark considers only the level of alcohol 
in the offender’s blood or breath and not the manner 
in which he drove or other mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances. In effect the benchmarks serve as a 
starting point from which Courts can develop the precise 
sentence to be imposed in each case after a careful 
assessment of all the circumstances. Ultimately, even 
in considering these benchmarks and guidelines, the 
Court must always be aware that in fi xing a sentence, 
the Court is exercising a discretionary judgment and the 
guidelines cannot and do not prescribe the exercise of 
that discretion. 
27.  To introduce some structure in the development of these 
guidelines, we formed the Sentencing Council in 2013, 
chaired by Justice Chao Hick Tin and on which I sit as 
an ex-offi cio member. The Council aims, among other 
things, to promote the development of a methodology 
and framework that will enhance consistency in 
sentencing by identifying areas in which the issuance 
of a judgment containing sentencing guidelines might 
promote coherence or consistency in sentencing. 
Appeals in these areas may then be assigned for 
hearing before a specially designated panel of three 
Judges, with a view to their considering the issuance of 
guideline judgments. Unlike some other jurisdictions in 
which sentencing panels or councils have been formed 
and function in a non-judicial capacity with a focus on 
data collection and on sentencing trends and practices, 
our Sentencing Council, which is constituted entirely 
of judges and judicial offi cers seeks to identify areas 
that would benefi t from judicial pronouncements at an 
appellate level. As the jurisprudence of these panels 
builds up over time, it is hoped that this will make an 
important contribution towards consistency and clarity 
in our sentencing practice. Of course, even aside 
from this process, the appellate Judges can and do 
prescribe sentencing guidelines whenever they deem it 
appropriate.
VI. Prospective Overruling 
28.  But the creation of sentencing guidelines and 
benchmarks can give rise to transitioning problems. 
This arises because shifts in societal concerns may 
conceivably cause shifts in sentencing; or at a more 
mundane level, if it turns out that the previously prevailing 
sentencing practice was misinformed or mistaken. How 
should a Court approach this without doing violence to 
the legitimate expectations that offenders may have 
formed based on previously entrenched precedents 
that are now considered unreliable?
29.  It is a core principle to the Rule of Law that rules are 
meant to be prospective, open and clear in order to be 
able to guide conduct.29 This is articulated in art 11(1) 
of our Constitution which prohibits punishment on the 
basis of a retroactive criminal law and in the maxim 
nullum crimen sine lege (which means that conduct 
cannot be punished as criminal unless some rule of law 
has already declared conduct of that kind to be criminal 
and punishable as such). Those who have conducted 
their affairs on the basis of a reasonable and legitimate 
understanding of the law may expect that they should 
not be penalised if a later judicial pronouncement 
establishes that the interpretation was wrong. But in the 
common law system, judicial pronouncements are by 
default, unbound by time, and apply both retroactively 
and prospectively. The Court’s pronouncement of the 
law would thus affect the specifi c offender before it 
as well as those yet to come. To balance the tension 
between the retroactive operation of the common 
law system and the Rule of Law value of laws being 
pronounced and applied prospectively, some Courts 
have developed and applied the concept of prospective 
overruling in selected cases. In Singapore, judicial 
pronouncements are by default fully retroactive, but the 
doctrine of prospective overruling is also recognised 
and has been applied. Appellate courts thus have the 
discretion to restrict the retrospective effect of their 
pronouncements within a framework including these 
factors: 30
 a.  the extent to which the law or legal principle 
concerned is entrenched;
 b.  the extent of the change to the law caused by the 
new ruling; 
 d.  the extent to which the change of the law is 
foreseeable; and
 e.  the extent of reliance on the law or legal principle 
concerned.  
30.  A clear example of the application of prospective 
overruling in Singapore may be found in Abdul Nasir 
bin Amer Hamsah v Public Prosecutor (“Abdul Nasir”).31 
The appellant had been sentenced to life imprisonment 
and 12 strokes of the cane for kidnapping. The prevailing 
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practice on the part of the Executive had been to treat 
a sentence of life imprisonment as equivalent to a 
sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. However, life 
imprisonment was interpreted by the Court of Appeal 
in Abdul Nasir to mean the whole of the remaining 
period of the convicted person’s natural life. This was 
a dramatic change from a hitherto well-established and 
well-known position and would have been crushing if it 
were applied retroactively. Indeed, the Court decided 
that to apply its ruling to the appellant would be grossly 
unfair and accordingly held that its decision would only 
take prospective effect. 
31.  A more recent decision where the issue was fully 
considered is Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li (“Hue 
An Li”).32 The accused had fallen asleep at the wheel 
and collided with a lorry thereby causing the death of a 
passenger in the lorry. She pleaded guilty to the charge 
of causing death by a negligent act and was fi ned 
$10,000 and disqualifi ed from driving for fi ve years. The 
accused placed reliance on a previous decision of the 
Court in Public Prosecutor v Gan Lim Soon (“Gan Lim 
Soon”),33 where it had been said that a fi ne would be 
suffi cient in most cases of causing death by a negligent 
act. But the relevant section of the Penal Code had 
been amended in the period since the pronouncement 
of the Court in Gan Lim Soon and as a result, it was 
held that the position in Gan Lim Soon was no longer 
tenable. The Court held that the starting point for such 
an offence was properly, a period of imprisonment for 
up to four weeks.34 However, reliance had been placed 
on Gan Lim Soon by various Courts at fi rst instance 
and on appeal, both before and after the amendments 
to the Penal Code had been made. Gan Lim Soon was 
thus well entrenched in the law and changes in the 
law in relation to it were not foreseeable. Therefore, 
prospective effect was given to the Court’s decision in 
Hue An Li in relation to its decision to depart from Gan 
Lim Soon.
32.  In Poh Boon Kiat,35 the same approach was taken 
on the basis that a revised benchmark which made 
imprisonment mandatory for fi rst time offenders 
for certain vice-related offences was contrary to 
the legitimate expectations of the accused as the 
entrenched position had been a fi ne.36  
33.  Prospective overruling raises some interesting issues 
as to whether the revised benchmark which is expressly 
stated to apply prospectively should take such effect 
immediately upon pronouncement so that trial Judges 
would be bound to apply the revised benchmarks 
immediately; or only to cases that are commenced 
after the pronouncement; or only to conduct committed 
after the pronouncement. There is no straightforward 
answer and this will have to be resolved in time 
through case-law. But as a wholly tentative observation 
offered without the benefi t of argument, if the primary 
underlying concern is that the legitimate expectations, 
upon which parties have arranged their affairs, should 
not be defeated, then it would suggest that the new 
rule would only apply to conduct that takes place after 
the rule has been pronounced. If however, the focus is 
instead on the institutional limitations of the judicial role 
and the concern that Judges should not be legislating 
transitional provisions to cover their pronouncements, 
then the new rule should be applicable to any case 
falling for determination after it has been pronounced. 
These are vexed issue that I suspect may have to be 
dealt with in due course.
VII. Th e Role of the Prosecution in Sentencing
34.  I have thus far focused on the role and practice of the 
Court in sentencing. Let me turn briefl y to consider 
another major stakeholder in the criminal justice system: 
the Public Prosecutor. The Prosecution owes a duty 
to the Court and to the wider public to ensure that 
the factually guilty and only the factually guilty are 
convicted, and that all relevant material is placed 
before the Court to assist it in its determination 
of the truth.37 This duty extends to the stage of 
sentencing where the Prosecution should place all 
the relevant facts of the offence and the offender 
before the Court. Furthermore, the Prosecution 
should always be prepared to assist the Court on 
any issues of sentencing.38 But what does this 
mean in practical terms?
 
35.  It is perhaps possible to extrapolate from those 
principles that are widely accepted and to arrive at some 
thoughts about the prosecutorial role in sentencing. 
First, the Prosecution acts only in the public interest. 
That immediately distinguishes it from those who 
appear in a private law suit to pursue the interest of a 
private client. On this basis, there would generally be no 
need for the Prosecution to adopt a strictly adversarial 
position. Second, that public interest extends not only to 
securing the conviction in a lawful and ethical manner of 
those who are factually guilty, but also to securing the 
appropriate sentence.
36.  The latter point is a critical one. Private victories tend to 
be measured by the size of the damages awarded or the 
pain infl icted on the opposing side. But the prosecutorial 
function is not calibrated by that scale. The appropriate 
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sentence will often not bear a linear relationship to the 
circumstances. A sentence of probation in one case 
may be more appropriate than a custodial sentence in 
another. Hence, this calls for the Prosecution to refl ect 
on why it takes a particular view of what sentence 
is called for in a given case and to articulate those 
considerations so that the sentencing Judge can assess 
these and assign them the appropriate weight.  
37.  I suggest that the Prosecution can play a vital role by 
identifying to the Court:
 a.  The relevant sentencing precedents, benchmarks 
and guidelines;
 b.  The relevant facts and circumstances of the offence 
and of the offender that inform where in the range of 
sentences the case at hand may be situated;
 c.  The offender’s suitability and other relevant 
considerations that may bear upon whether 
particular sentencing options that might be available 
should be invoked;
 d.  The relevant aggravating and mitigating 
considerations; 
 e.  The relevant considerations that pertain to 
aggregating sentences
 f.  Any particular interest or consideration that is 
relevant and that pertains to the victim; and 
 g.  Where it may be appropriate to order compensation 
to be paid to the victim, the relevant considerations 
(including the appropriate quantum).  
38.  While the Prosecution may take the position that a certain 
sentencing range is appropriate in the circumstances, 
it must present all the relevant materials to enable the 
Court to come to its own conclusion as to what the just 
sentence should be. 
39.  These broad guidelines can be supplemented with 
another very practical point. All the relevant facts must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and in guilty 
pleas, the accused must know all the facts on the 
basis of which he pleaded guilty. For the Prosecution 
to raise a fact undisclosed in the statement of facts or 
ask the Court to draw an inference from the facts at the 
stage of sentencing may be unfairly prejudicial to the 
offender, who cannot be punished for something that 
is not proven.39 Hence, the statement of facts must be 
prepared with this in mind.
40.  The Court’s role in arriving at the correct sentence 
can be greatly assisted by the Prosecution and I look 
forward to the Prosecution adopting these suggestions 
in formulating sentencing submissions. 
VIII. Conclusion 
41.  I began this address by considering some theories of 
crime and punishment; and then examined some of the 
basic nuts and bolts of sentencing from the perspective 
of the Courts and the role of the Prosecution in 
sentencing.
42.  Before closing, let me make some observations on 
the need to keep an eye on what happens after the 
sentence has been served. In most cases, the end 
goal of punishment must be to reintegrate offenders 
into society. The criminal justice system would not be 
complete without such a narrative. The reintegration 
of offenders extends beyond the rehabilitation and 
reformation of the offender and focuses instead on the 
offender’s re-inclusion or restoration as a member of 
society after serving the sentence. It is concerned with 
allowing full citizenship together with its accompanying 
rights and responsibilities to resume. The ex-offender 
should be able to move forward in society40 and not 
be punished further by being cast aside whether 
intentionally or otherwise. Unlike rehabilitation which 
often works on the offender through reformative or 
curative programmes, reintegration works with the 
offender so that he can become the agent of his own 
reform.41 There are considerable social benefi ts that can 
be traced to successful reintegration efforts, including 
reducing recidivism and the social costs of crime, and 
accessing a valuable pool of human resource. How 
then might we enhance the prospects of reintegration? 
43.  In traditional sentencing frameworks, the Court’s role 
in reintegrating the offender would be to consider 
the objective of imposing a sentence that would 
rehabilitate and so promote the reintegration of the 
offender. Although the Singapore Prisons Service 
provides academic and vocational training to prisoners 
in order to improve their prospects of employment 
upon release,42 the Court may take the view that other 
types of sentences might be more benefi cial to the 
long term prospects of reintegration and might on this 
basis choose to order probation, reformative training or 
community-based sentences.
 
44.  Going beyond this, there are plans to extend the 
emphasis on reintegration by monitoring how 
offenders progress after sentencing and to hold 
offenders accountable for change. This is being done 
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through a new innovation referred to as the Progress 
Accountability Court, working in collaboration with the 
Singapore Prisons Service and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. The Progress Accountability Court will consider 
the offender’s present continuing conduct, while being 
cognisant of his past, and work with him towards 
securing his future. The offender will be invited to accept 
responsibility for his own progress and various aspects 
of his conduct will be pointed out both of as well as for 
improvement.
 
45.  In the case of young offenders there will rarely be any 
confl ict between the public interest and that of the 
offender. The public have no greater interest than that 
the young offender becomes a good citizen.43 There is 
also often an interest in keeping young offenders out 
of the prison environment where they might more likely 
come into contact with hardened criminal elements 
and also face stigmatisation after being released.44 
To prevent this, alternative sentencing options are 
available which may better fulfi l the dominant objectives 
of rehabilitation and reintegration in relation to young 
offenders. As noted in Public Prosecutor v Mohammad 
Al-Ansari bin Basri,45 probation and reformative training 
are two forms of sentences which are an expression of 
those dominant objectives.
46.  Probation orders do not give rise to a conviction and 
so these will enable offenders to maintain a crime-
free record. The idea is to wean them away from any 
propensity towards long time involvement in crime, 
and to enable and encourage reform so that they may 
become self-reliant and useful members of society.46 
One of the legislative objects of the Probation of 
Offender Act47 is to rehabilitate young offenders. The 
Parliamentary Debates referred to the fact that young 
offenders would “benefi t from the personal care, 
guidance and supervision of a Probation Offi cer”, 
giving them an opportunity “to turn over a new leaf 
and become … responsible member[s] of society”.48 A 
probation order is intended to provide support for the 
individual so as to assist him in avoiding further crime. 
This in turn advances the greater public interest by 
helping to protect society as a whole.49
47.  Reformative training is a sentencing option which is 
only available to persons under the age of 21, and 
can be imposed in lieu of imprisonment, even where 
the offender already has a criminal record. It thus 
affords the Courts with some fl exibility. Offenders 
are “constructively engaged” during the period of 
incarceration and subject to a compulsory post-release 
phase during which they will be placed under supervision 
and are liable to be recalled for failure to comply with 
the conditions imposed on them. The regime involves 
a combined effort on the part of the trainees’ mentors, 
family members and senior re-integration offi cers from 
the supervision centre to ensure a smooth return into 
society.50 
48.  With the new Criminal Procedure Code which came into 
effect in 2011, our Courts have also been empowered to 
impose community-based sentences which afford the 
sentencing Judge considerable fl exibility in dealing with 
offenders with a view towards enhancing their chances 
of reintegration while maintaining the penal objectives 
of deterrence, retribution and crime prevention. 
 
49.  Reintegration through the use of community-based 
sentences is enhanced primarily because the 
offender is not dislodged from society. This minimises 
stigmatisation and exclusion and hence inevitably, 
makes reintegration much easier. Reintegration might 
also be enhanced by pairing a sentence of probation 
with appropriate conditions, thereby providing a more 
focused rehabilitative and re-integrative structure for 
the offender.51 
50.  Ladies and gentlemen, the task of sentencing an 
offender justly is, defi nitely, a complex exercise. This 
is a question that concerns not only the Courts but all 
the stakeholders in the criminal justice system. With the 
assistance of the Prosecution and the Defence Bar, the 
Courts can expect to be well-placed to discharge their 
function of imposing the just and appropriate sentence 
for each case. But the system would be enhanced if the 
stakeholders kept fi rmly in mind the goal of ensuring 
that after the sentence has been served, ex-offenders 
are re-integrated into mainstream society. I believe the 
discussions in the course of this Conference will indeed 
raise many interesting issues and perspectives and 
provide much further material for debate and study. I 
wish you all a most fruitful conference. Thank you. 
∗  I am deeply grateful to my law clerk, Leong Yi-Ming, for the considerable 
assistance she gave me in the research and preparation of this paper.
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Just Walk – Justice on the Move
The Chief Justice, Judges and members of the Bar participating in the walk
The Law Society of Singapore held its inaugural Walkathon, 
Just Walk “Justice on the Move” on 10 January 2015. 
Approximately 2,000 lawyers, friends from the legal fraternity 
and the wider community participated in the 5.4km walk past 
key legal institutions such as the Supreme Court, the State 
Courts, Attorney-General’s Chambers, Ministry of Law and the 
Law Society of Singapore, highlighting the community’s belief 
that fairness and justice are of paramount importance. 
Participants included, amongst others the Honourable Chief 
Justice Sundaresh Menon, Attorney-General VK Rajah, Justice 
Steven Chong, Justice Vinodh Coomaraswamy and Judicial 
Commissioner See Kee Oon. The morning walk concluded 
with participants giving a long round of applause to celebrate 
the contributions of the late Subhas Anandan before enjoying 
a lively concert featuring the talented Abraham Vergis from 
Providence Law, The Unbillables, a nine-man band from Backer 
& Mackenzie.Wong & Leow, amongst others.  
Just Walk “Justice on the Move” marked a concerted attempt to 
ensure widening income gap or social divide does not prevent 
individuals from obtaining adequate legal representation. 
The walkathon raised more than $2 million which includes a 
dollar-for-dollar matching contribution from the Government's 
Care and Share grant. The funds raised from the Walkathon 
will go towards the Society's Justice for All initiative and will 
support its outreach work, increase awareness and provide 
legal representation to those who are in need but are of limited 
means.     
One such initiative is Enhanced CLAS which now covers a 
broader range of offences and provides unbundled services 
which assist those who have decided to plead guilty. It also 
boasts fi ve CLAS Fellows who work on CLAS cases full-time, 
representing CLAS applicants. Enhanced CLAS hopes to reach 
out to more than 6,000 people a year.
Just Walk “Justice on the Move” would not have been a success 
without the support of our stakeholders, the community and 
members. We are pleased to acknowledge our donors below.
“We were very pleased to be part of the Just Walk “Justice on the Move” initiative in support 
of the Law Society of Singapore’s outreach 
eff orts for pro bono programmes. Th e event 
was well organised and the walk covering the 
key institutions in Singapore’s legal landscape 
was especially meaningful for the State Courts, 
as we celebrate the 40th anniversary of the 
State Courts building this year in September. 
It was extremely heartening to see the great 
enthusiasm and support from my colleagues 
and all those who walked with us.” 
Judicial Commissioner See Kee Oon, Presiding Judge of 
the State Courts
“Th e Just Walk event was an excellent opportunity for the legal fraternity and its 
stakeholders to come together to support a good 
cause. Th e Supreme Court was very pleased to 
be able to be a part of this meaningful event. I 
am very heartened by the enthusiasm and eff orts 
of my colleagues who not only participated in 
the walkathon but raised funds for pro bono 
services with a Charity Bazaar.” 
Juthika Ramanathan, Chief Executive, Supreme Court
A word from our participants about Just Walk
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About the Conference 
The Litigation Conference 2015 is proudly presented by the Civil Practice Committee of The Law 
Society of Singapore. The two-day Conference (16 & 17 March 2015) aims to bring together the 
judiciary, senior practitioners and industry experts across various jurisdictions to provide fresh 
insight on the latest developments in this area of practice. 
The theme for Litigation Conference 2015 is International Commercial Litigation, leveraging 
on the much anticipated launch of the Singapore International Commercial Court.  International 
speakers will be invited to speak and take part in an exchange of ideas which would benefi t 
international commercial litigation and, by extension, the SICC.
Some of the topical issues to be discussed at the Conference include the following:
 • SICC in Perspective: Commentary and Q&A
 • Jurisdictional Issues
 • Enforcement (SICC)
 • Choosing a Judicial Approach for the Future - Adversarial, Inquisitorial or a Hybrid?
 • Litigation Funding
 • Managing Mega Litigation
 • The Future of International Commercial Litigation
About the Organisers 
The Law Society is a key provider of continuing professional development programmes for legal 
professionals in Singapore. The Law Society provides practice-oriented programmes which 
are aimed at helping legal professionals to acquire and maintain professional competence in 
core areas of practice and to keep up with the latest legal developments and emerging areas of 
practice.
Sponsorship Opportunities
A variety of sponsorship opportunities are available for this Conference. For further details, please 
contact cpd@lawsoc.org.sg
Registration is Open!
For more information, please visit our website at:
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/conference/litigation2015/
Public CPD Points:
6 Points
(Day 1)
6 Points
(Day 2)
Practice Area:
Civil Procedure
Training Level:
General
Dismantling Human Traffi  cking: 
Th e Need for a Dedicated Piece of Legislation
In November 2014, a dedicated piece of legislation to combat human traffi cking 
was debated and passed in Parliament by way of a private member’s Bill after 
close consultation with the public and the Singapore Inter-Agency Taskforce on 
Traffi cking-in-Persons. The article explains the reasons and motivations behind the 
introduction of the Prevention of Human Traffi cking Bill and its main tenets.
Over the years, there have been attempts to deter 
human traffi cking. These valuable attempts have come 
in the form of various pieces of legislation, including the 
Women’s Charter, the Children & Young Persons Act and 
the Immigration Act. However, because these pieces of 
legislation were not specifi cally enacted to deter human 
traffi cking, their effectiveness in that regard is limited. 
Past Limitations
The Women’s Charter does not criminalise the act of 
traffi cking a man. The Children & Young Persons Act only 
applies to victims below a certain age. The Immigration Act 
deals more with situations of human smuggling where, by 
and large, the person smuggled consents to be smuggled. 
In principle, none of these limitations should have prevented 
the criminalisation of the act of traffi cking, ie neither the age 
nor the gender of the victim should prevent the prosecution 
of the offender, and consent of the victim to traffi cking 
should be deemed invalid in law. 
This suggested the need to enact a dedicated piece of legislation 
to deter human traffi cking and, also, to protect the victims of it.
New Objectives
The objectives of the Prevention of Human Traffi cking Bill 
are four-fold. First, the Bill clarifi es our legal regime by 
providing a formal defi nition of traffi cking-in-persons (“TIP”) 
and prescribing appropriate penalties to allow us to deal 
with human traffi cking in a more targeted and deterrent 
manner. Second, it empowers enforcement agencies 
with the necessary investigation and enforcement levers 
to tackle TIP. Third, it provides measures to protect and 
support traffi cked victims, and encourage the reporting 
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of traffi cking or suspected traffi cking activities. Lastly, the 
Bill will bring Singapore closer in line with international 
standards, and uplift efforts to combat TIP in Singapore and 
the surrounding region.
A New and Relevant Defi nition
Signifi cantly, the new law dedicated to criminalise traffi cking 
in persons possesses the added ability to deter acts beyond 
the more known type of exploitation – essentially, the 
dedicated legislation has the width to cover not just sexual 
exploitation but exploitation of innocent victims for different, 
lesser known, purposes, such as labour traffi cking and 
organ traffi cking.
Therefore, the recently passed Prevention of Human 
Traffi cking Bill states:
  Any person who recruits, transports, transfers, harbours 
or receives an individual... by means of  
 a. the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion;
 b. abduction; 
 c. fraud or deception; 
 d. the abuse of power
 e.  the abuse of a position of vulnerability of the 
individual; or
 f.  the giving to, or the receipt by, another person 
having control over that individual of any money or 
other benefi t to secure that other person’s consent
  for the purpose of exploitation (whether in Singapore or 
elsewhere) of the individual shall be guilty of an offence.
Signifi cantly, the defi nition of exploitation is a wide one, 
ie “exploitation” includes not just sexual exploitation but 
the removal of organs, forced labour, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery or servitude.
From the defi nition above, the law makes clear the three 
necessary elements for the offence to be made out. First, 
there must be an “act” of recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of an individual. Second, 
this act must be accompanied by “means” of a threat or 
use of force, or any other form of coercion, of abduction, or 
fraud, or deception, or of an abuse of power or a position 
of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefi ts to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over the traffi cked victim. Third, these must be done for 
the “purpose of exploitation”, such as sexual exploitation, 
forced labour, or organ removal. As TIP is a serious charge, 
all three elements must be proved. Cases which fall short 
of the required thresholds may still be taken up by other 
existing laws, where appropriate.
Less Distinction Makes for a More Versatile Law
No distinction is made between a female or a male victim 
and, importantly, the consent of a victim of traffi cking in 
persons to the intended exploitation is irrelevant in the 
eyes of the law when determining whether an offence of 
traffi cking in persons has been committed. 
Under the Prevention of Human Traffi cking Bill, gender, 
consent and age will not form barriers to prosecution – this 
allows for a more versatile law.
An Answer to Hybrid Exploitation
The law has the ability to deal with hybrid types of exploitation. 
For example, if a lady comes to Singapore under the belief 
that she will work as a waitress in a restaurant but when 
she arrives is forced, against her will, into providing sexual 
services to customers in addition to serving them drinks 
and she is not paid for her service, then such a case could 
arguably fall under two limbs of exploitation – namely, 
sexual exploitation and forced labour. This signals that no 
single type of exploitation is more heinous than the other. 
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Th e Law Addresses the Transnational Nature of the 
Crime
It does not matter whether the act of traffi cking in persons 
is done partly in and partly outside Singapore provided 
that the act, if done wholly in Singapore, would constitute 
an offence of traffi cking in persons. This allows the law to 
recognise the transnational nature of the crime and deter it.
Public Consultations
In the course of 2014, six public consultation sessions were 
convened with members of the public, the legal fraternity, 
religious and secular groups, NGOs and VWOs to seek 
views and suggestions on the proposed Prevention of 
Human Traffi cking Bill. These views and suggestions – 
and the open sharing of experiences of those working 
with and amongst traffi cked persons – canvassed from 
300 participants were instrumental in shaping the Bill. Key 
fi ndings during the public consultations were considered 
carefully. For example, it was raised during the public 
consultation that Singapore’s defi nition of key TIP terms 
should be closely aligned with international benchmarks 
and standards, but should also be adapted to suit the 
local context. Another key fi nding was that the Bill should 
cover TIP perpetrators and all parties in the criminal value 
chain, including abettors, middlemen and facilitators of 
TIP offences. Essentially, the responses during the public 
consultations assisted in achieving the following features in 
the Bill: 
International standards
As aligned with international standards, the Bill defi nes a 
person under 18 years old as a child. The law stipulates 
lower requirements for the traffi cking offence to be made 
out for child victims in recognition of their vulnerability to 
exploitation. To afford a child greater protection under the 
law, there is no requirement for the Prosecution to prove the 
methods or means used. It is suffi cient for the Prosecution 
to show that there was an act to recruit, transport, transfer, 
harbour or receive a child victim for the purposes of 
exploitation.
Recruitment and transportation overseas 
As TIP is a transnaƟ onal crime, the law holds a traﬃ  cking 
oﬀ ender liable in Singapore even if his acts which comprise the 
oﬀ ence straddle between Singapore and another jurisdicƟ on. 
This recognises the transnaƟ onal nature of traﬃ  cking acƟ viƟ es 
where the acts of recruitment and transportaƟ on may take place 
overseas with Singapore being the desƟ naƟ on or the transit 
point.
Ringleaders and masterminds 
Besides traffi ckers, persons who abet the offence are 
similarly liable to be punished. The law sets out acts which 
constitute abetment of the traffi cking offence under the 
Penal Code. These include conveying instructions, providing 
transport or shelter, or participating in any act to promote 
the actual or intended exploitation of the traffi cked victim. 
The scope of the law covers ringleaders and masterminds 
who order their subordinates to carry out the traffi cking acts, 
as well as middlemen who knowingly make arrangements 
to place traffi cked victims with their exploiters.
Profi ting from TIP
It will additionally be an offence for a person to receive 
any payment in connection with the exploitation of another 
person with the knowledge that he or she has been traffi cked. 
This targets persons such as pimps and labour agents who 
have received payment from the traffi cking activity but who 
are not directly involved in the traffi cking offence itself or in 
the abetment of it.
Protection of victims
The best way to protect those at risk of becoming victims is 
to deter human traffi cking altogether. But, deterrence of the 
crime without a focus on the vulnerable and innocent victims 
would not be ideal. Thus, the law provides for temporary 
shelter so that recovery can take place in the safety of a 
secure environment beyond the reach or manipulation of 
the offender or associated syndicates. Counselling is also 
legislated as a victim care measure, in the hope that this will 
assist victims in their recovery. Further support measures 
in the form of trials in camera and the non-disclosure of 
victims’ names in the media are part of the legislation so that 
the giving of testimony in Court, which can be a traumatic 
event for victims, will be made somewhat easier. 
Calibrated Penalties
To provide suffi cient deterrence and refl ect the severity of 
human traffi cking, the Bill prescribes stiff penalties in the 
form of mandatory imprisonment terms and fi nes. Under 
cl 4(1), a fi rst-time offender of a traffi cking offence shall 
be punished with a fi ne not exceeding $100,000 and with 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.
Convicted persons may further be liable to caning not 
exceeding six strokes, which can be imposed at the Court’s 
discretion where warranted. To send a stronger signal 
against those who are minded to re-offend, the penalties for 
a repeat offender will be a fi ne not exceeding $150,000 and 
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imprisonment for up to 15 years, essentially up to one and 
a half times what a fi rst offender could be liable to receive. 
Caning of up to nine strokes will also be mandatory for 
repeat offenders. Similar penalties are prescribed for the 
offence of knowingly receiving payment in connection with 
exploitation of a traffi cked person.
Taken together, these provisions create an encompassing 
umbrella of offences that target the main TIP actors, and 
allow us to take them fi rmly to task.
In calibrating the penalties, they were benchmarked against 
comparable crimes of somewhat similar gravity in other 
Acts, such as the offence of importing a woman for purposes 
of prostitution under s 373A of the Penal Code which also 
provides for a maximum 10-year imprisonment sentence. 
Listing Aggravating Factors will Aid the Court in 
Sentencing
To further recognise the grave injustice suffered by victims 
of human traffi cking, the legislation provides a non-
exhaustive list of aggravating factors which the Court may 
take cognisance of when considering whether a harsher 
punishment is merited. Such factors include where:
1.  the offence involves serious injury or death of the victim 
or another individual;
2.  the traffi cked victim was particularly vulnerable due 
to pregnancy, illness, infi rmity, disability or any other 
reason, and the offender was aware of the traffi cked 
victim’s particular vulnerability;
3.  the traffi cked victim was a child; or
4.  the offence exposed the traffi cked victim to a life-
threatening illness.
As an extension of these principles, and as mentioned 
above, where a person is convicted of a second or 
subsequent offence, the Court may sentence the person to 
a punishment one and a half times more severe than the 
amount of punishment the Court would have meted out to a 
fi rst time offender.
Th e Selfl ess Work of Th ose Who Assist Traffi  cked 
Persons
When I visited a local shelter last year, before the Bill was 
introduced in Parliament, I was moved by the commitment 
of the staff in their care for traffi cked women. During a 
tour of the centre, they shared the centre’s philosophy: “It 
is worthwhile to leave the whole world behind to save one 
life”. Such is the commitment of the many good people who 
assist the vulnerable who fall prey to traffi cking syndicates.
The Bill shares that ethos. Indeed, if a syndicate is deterred 
from exploiting just one person as a result of this Bill, it 
would have served its purpose. Of course, it is hoped that 
the Bill will protect more than just one person from being 
exploited.
Conclusion
Human traffi cking is an inhumane crime, which leaves victims 
buried in deep anguish. A dedicated piece of legislation allows 
us to deter this scourge and protect our most vulnerable. It 
attempts to empower the powerless and give a voice to the 
voiceless. It is hoped that the law will help deter exploitation 
of victims on our shores and the transhipment of victims 
through our country. It signals the values our society holds 
– the rejection of human exploitation and the willingness to 
protect and care for the vulnerable.
*  Christopher serves as a Member of Parliament for Holland–Bukit Timah GRC. 
He is in legal practice as a partner with Lee & Lee, where he represents clients 
in Court and arbitrations. 
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Probing the Law on Probation: Suggestions 
for Reform Mohamad Fairuuz bin Saleh v PP 
[2014] SGHC 264
Introduction
To any criminal law practitioner, the Court’s power to 
grant probation as a sentencing option is of signifi cant 
importance. Probation represents, to their clients, the key 
out of incarceration.
Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act (Cap 252, 1985 
Rev Ed) (“POA”) sets out the power of the Singapore Courts 
to grant probation. Section 5 uses three peculiar terms to 
create three categories of offences, namely:
1. Sentences which are “fi xed by law”; 
2.  Sentences carrying “specifi ed minimum sentences”; 
and 
3. Sentences carrying “mandatory minimum sentences”.
For the latter two categories of offences, the Court can only 
grant probation if the offender:
1. is between 16 and 21 of age at the time of conviction; and
2.  was not previously convicted of an offence with a 
mandatory or specifi ed minimum sentence.
What do those three peculiar terms mean? 
Setting the Scene
The learned Tay Yong Kwang J in Lim Li Ling v PP [2007] 1 
SLR(R) 165 (“Lim Li Ling”) considered those three terms in 
some detail. Tay J held that:
1.  A “mandatory minimum sentence” means a sentence 
where a minimum quantum for a particular type of 
sentence is prescribed, and the imposition of that type 
of sentence is mandatory;
2.  A “specifi ed minimum sentence” means a sentence 
where a minimum quantum for a particular type of 
sentence is prescribed, but the imposition of that type 
of sentence is not mandatory; and
3.  A sentence “fi xed by law” is one where the Court 
has no discretion as to the type of sentence (which 
is mandatory) and the quantum of the prescribed 
punishment, and also includes “mandatory minimum 
sentences” and “specifi ed minimum sentences”.
However, counsels' (and their clients’) desire to secure the 
invaluable key of probation has led to continued debate over 
In Mohamad Fairuuz bin Saleh v PP [2014] SGHC 164, a specially constituted 
three-judge panel of the Singapore High Court considered the proper construction 
of s 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act. In doing so, the Court identifi ed anomalies 
in the effect of s 5 where probation is not a sentencing option for certain offences 
that are relatively less serious in nature. This article discusses the anomalies raised 
by the Court and proposes practical solutions to rectify those anomalies.
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how each of those three terms should be interpreted. In PP v 
Lin Zhi Yi (Magistrate’s Appeal No 361 of 2010) (“Lin Zhi Yi”), 
the Singapore High Court granted probation to a 23-year-old 
offender although the offence in question ostensibly carried 
a specifi ed minimum sentence. The offender was convicted 
under s 14(1)(b)(i) of the Moneylenders Act 2008, which 
provided for “a fi ne of not less than $20,000 and not more 
than $200,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
2 years or to both”.  The option of granting a fi ne of not less 
than $20,000 ostensibly satisfi ed Tay J’s interpretation of a 
“specifi ed minimum sentence”. Consequently, if one were to 
follow Lim Li Ling, it is arguable that the High Court did not 
have the power to grant probation in Lin Zhi Yi.  
As the High Court’s decision in Lin Zhi Yi was unreported, 
practitioners did not have the benefi t of the Court’s 
reasoning: how then should Lin Zhi Yi be reconciled with Lim 
Li Ling? The need for clarifi cation was compounded when 
Part XVII of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 
Rev Ed) (“CPC”) – enacted in 2010 to introduce “community 
sentences” – adopted the same three phrases in setting out 
the Court’s power to grant community sentences.  
The uncertainties in the law were recently addressed by 
a specially constituted three-judge-panel of the Singapore 
High Court (presided by Sundaresh Menon CJ) in Mohamad 
Fairuuz bin Saleh v PP [2014] SGHC 264 (“Fairuuz”). 
This note fi rst summarises how the Court in Fairuuz had 
interpreted s 5 of the POA, before discussing the anomalies 
in the operation of s 5 that Fairuuz had identifi ed. A review of 
the POA may, therefore, be timely. This writer offers certain 
practical solutions that may be considered by the legislature 
in ameliorating the anomalies identifi ed by the Court.
Proper Interpretation of the POA
Section 5(1) of the POA comprises a main body and 
a proviso. The main body of s 5(1) of the POA reads as 
follows:
  5. —(1) Where a court by or before which a person 
is convicted of an offence (not being an offence the 
sentence for which is fi xed by law) is of the opinion 
that having regard to the circumstances, including the 
nature of the offence and the character of the offender, 
it is expedient to do so, the court may, instead of 
sentencing him, make a probation order, that is to say, 
an order requiring him to be under the supervision of 
a probation offi cer or a volunteer probation offi cer for 
a period to be specifi ed in the order of not less than 6 
months nor more than 3 years (emphasis added).
Immediately following the main body of s 5(1) of the POA, a 
proviso reads as follows:
  Provided that where a person is convicted of an 
offence for which a specifi ed minimum sentence or 
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment 
or fi ne or caning is prescribed by law, the court may 
make a probation order if the person —
 (a)  has attained the age of 16 years but has not attained 
the age of 21 years at the time of his conviction; and
 (b)   has not been previously convicted of any such 
offence referred to in this proviso, and for this 
purpose section 11(1) shall not apply to any such 
previous conviction (emphasis added).
The Court in Fairuuz agreed with Lim Li Ling on the 
interpretation of the terms “mandatory minimum sentence” 
and “specifi ed minimum sentence” found in the proviso to s 
5 of the POA. The Court, however, held that offences which 
have sentences that were “fi xed by law” did not include 
offences which carried mandatory or specifi ed minimum 
sentences. Be that as it may, the Court recognised that the 
interpretation in Lim Li Ling would ultimately yield the same 
result.
Specifi ed Minimum Sentence
Out of the three terms under consideration, the Prosecution’s 
submissions on the term “specifi ed minimum sentence” 
merit mention. This term posed some diffi culty because of a 
dearth of legislative material and case law that would shed 
light on its proper interpretation.
The Prosecution contended that Lim Li Ling’s interpretation 
was incorrect. According to the Prosecution, an offence 
would carry a “specifi ed minimum sentence” only if the 
punishment provision carried two elements: 
1.  A sentence which is at the discretion of the Court to 
impose but which if it is imposed carries with it a 
stipulated minimum quantum; and 
2. An independent mandatory sentence.
This point is better illustrated with an example. According to 
the Prosecution, if an offence provided for a discretionary 
fi ne of at least $10,000, or a discretionary jail term not 
exceeding fi ve years, that was not an offence which carried 
a “specifi ed minimum sentence”.  However, if an offence 
provided for a discretionary fi ne of at least $10,000, and a 
mandatory jail term not exceeding fi ve years, that was an 
offence which carried a “specifi ed minimum sentence”. 
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The basis for the Prosecution’s submission was the 
Explanatory Statement to the Probation of Offenders Bill 
(Bill No 25 of 93). The Explanatory Statement provided as 
an example of a “specifi ed minimum sentence” s 4 of the 
Betting Act (Cap 21, 1985 Rev Ed). Any person convicted of 
an offence under s 4:
  … shall be liable on conviction to a fi ne of not less than 
$10,000 and not more than $100,000 and shall also be 
punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 
years.
Section 4 of the Betting Act carries with it two types 
of punishment – a discretionary fi ne, which is subject 
to a minimum amount, and mandatory imprisonment. 
Consequently, the Prosecution’s argument was that the 
term “specifi ed minimum sentence” must be construed 
narrowly in strict compliance with the example of s 4. 
The Prosecution’s position was not accepted. According to 
the Court, the term “specifi ed minimum sentence”, on its 
plain meaning, refers to the sentence that is imposed rather 
than the range of punishment options that are prescribed. 
The only part of the punishment provision in s 4 of the 
Betting Act that could be read as containing a specifi ed 
minimum sentence was the fi ne. 
Be that as it may, what is noteworthy was the effect that the 
Prosecution’s argument sought to achieve. Underlying the 
Prosecution’s submission is a recognition that the scope of 
the term “specifi ed minimum sentence” should not be overly 
expansive.  
Legislative materials suggest that the proviso to s 5 of the 
POA was enacted to restrict the circumstances under which 
probation could be granted for “serious” offences. During 
the reading of the relevant Bill, Minister Yeo Cheow Tong 
stated that the proviso was intended to deny probation for 
“very serious offences, like rape, robbery, being part of a 
syndicate in extortion” (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 
Offi cial Report (10 November 1993) vol 61 at col 936):
  I would like to clarify that only offenders who are guilty 
or who have been convicted of serious offences are 
denied probation, ie, they are convicted and sentenced 
with a mandatory minimum sentence and therefore they 
are denied probation.  Sir, these are for very serious 
offences, like rape, robbery, being part of a syndicate in 
extortion, and so on.  For the other lesser offences they 
are still eligible for probation.
The terms “minimum mandatory sentence” and “specifi ed 
minimum sentence” used in the proviso therefore acted as 
proxy indicators for offences which were “serious”. Probation 
would not be available as a sentencing option for adult (or 
repeat youth) offenders in offences carrying mandatory or 
specifi ed minimum sentences.
Consequently, if the scope of the term “specifi ed minimum 
sentence” was overly expansive, there would potentially be 
more offences for which the Court could grant probation 
only when the two conditions in the proviso were met. That 
would have the effect of curtailing the Court’s powers to 
grant probation – an effect the Prosecution’s submission in 
Fairuuz sought to avoid.
Defi ciencies of the POA
Although the Prosecution’s submission was not accepted, 
the Prosecution’s underlying concern not to restrict the 
availability of probation as a sentencing option was shared 
by the Court. The Court identifi ed certain anomalies where 
probation was not available as a sentencing option for 
offences which were relatively less serious in nature.
Specifi cally, the Court observed that the usage of “minimum 
mandatory sentence” and “specifi ed minimum sentence” as 
proxy indicators for “serious” offences created anomalous 
results (Fairuuz at [74]-[76]):
  [W]e would like to make some observations in relation to 
what might appear to be anomalous in some respects as 
to the circumstances in which probation might or might 
not be available as a sentencing option. Specifi cally, 
the concern is that probation would not be a sentencing 
option for adult offenders (as a result of para (a) of the 
Proviso) and repeat youth offenders (as a result of para 
(b) of the Proviso) for what might appear to be relatively 
less serious offences, whereas it might well be a 
sentencing option for adult offenders and repeat youth 
offenders who have committed what are seemingly 
more serious offences just because Parliament has not 
thought it fi t to impose either a mandatory or specifi ed 
minimum sentence in the latter instances. An illustration 
will bring the point into focus.
  A fi rst time offender convicted of an offence for the 
possession, exhibition or distribution of uncensored 
fi lms under s 21 of the Films Act (Cap 107, 1998 Rev 
Ed) shall be liable to “a fi ne of not less than $100 for 
each such fi lm that he had in his possession (but not 
to exceed in the aggregate $20,000”). As a fi ne is the 
only prescribed sentence for this offence, the sentence 
would ordinarily be in the nature of a mandatory 
minimum sentence and consequently, the Proviso 
would apply to preclude the granting of probation 
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to both adult offenders and repeat youth offenders. 
However, probation would seem to be available to the 
same adult offender or repeat youth offender for what 
may be considered to be more serious offences but 
where the prescribed sentence is not a mandatory or 
specifi ed minimum sentence, and therefore does not 
engage the Proviso. For instance, following Poh Boon 
Kiat, the sentence under s 140(1) of the Women’s 
Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) for keeping, managing 
or assisting in the management of a brothel is a 
mandatory imprisonment term “not exceeding 5 years” 
and a discretionary fi ne “not exceeding $10,000”. This 
sentence for an offence under s 140(1) of the Women’s 
Charter is neither a mandatory nor a specifi ed minimum 
sentence (even though a period of imprisonment is 
mandatory). Accordingly, the Proviso would not apply. 
As a result, the principal part of s 5(1) of the POA 
would govern and the consequence is that probation 
would prima facie be available to both adult offenders 
and repeat youth offenders. As noted above, this might 
appear to be anomalous.
  We accept, of course, that it is a matter for Parliament 
rather than for the courts to decide on the relative gravity 
of offences. It chose to contain the excessive reach of 
the decision in Juma’at by the enactment of the Proviso. 
But the policy considerations that underlie a legislative 
choice to impose a mandatory or specifi ed minimum 
sentence may not necessarily be identical or relevant to 
the consideration of whether or not probation should be 
available in a given case. We offer these observations 
as something Parliament may wish to consider.
These anomalies exist because the terms “mandatory 
minimum sentence” and “specifi ed minimum sentence”, by 
themselves, are not optimal proxy indicators as to when 
probation should be a sentencing option. While the term 
“specifi ed minimum sentence” appeared to have made its 
debut only in the proviso to s 5 of the POA introduced in 
1993, mandatory minimum sentences were introduced for 
various offences to the Penal Code in 1984 because the 
legislature thought that the punishment for those offences 
was too lenient and that harsher punishment was needed 
to combat the increasing crime rate at that time.  While the 
legislature had focused on offences which had “caused 
the most concern and alarm to the public”, the use of 
mandatory minimum sentences was primarily to counter 
what the legislature thought were “generally inadequate 
sentences” where Courts were “generally averse to 
custodial sentences”.  
Using “mandatory minimum sentences” as a proxy indicator 
in the proviso to s 5 of the POA is, therefore, arguably over-
inclusive and under-inclusive at the same time. It is over-
inclusive because it potentially includes offences which by 
their nature may not be serious, but had originally attracted 
what the legislature thought were inadequate sentences 
such as to warrant the introduction of mandatory minimum 
sentences. It is under-inclusive because it potentially 
excludes offences which by their nature are serious, but 
did not attract inadequate sentences such as to warrant the 
introduction of mandatory minimum sentences. The same 
critique applies to the use of “specifi ed minimum sentence” 
as well.
Several examples will illustrate this point.  
Probation is not available as a sentencing option for an adult 
(or repeat youth) offender for relatively minor offences such 
as: possession, exhibition or distribution of uncensored fi lms 
under s 21 of the Films Act (Cap 107, 1998 Rev Ed), and 
touting under s 32 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public 
Order and Nuisance) Act (Cap 184, 1997 Rev Ed). 
Yet probation is available for certain relatively more serious 
offences such as voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous 
weapons or means, buying or disposing of any person 
as a slave, buying a minor for purposes of prostitution, 
rioting with a deadly weapon, concealing the existence of a 
design to wage war against the Government, abandoning a 
child under 12 years of age, and causing death by rash or 
negligent act.
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Discretionary Death Sentences
Another thorny issue concerns offences which used to 
carry mandatory death but now carry discretionary death 
sentences, such as ss 300(b), (c) and (d) of the Panel 
Code. For these offences, the Court now has the discretion 
to choose between death or imprisonment for life (and if the 
latter, the offender is also liable to caning).
Offences which carry a mandatory death penalty are 
offences for which the sentence is “fi xed by law”.  Probation 
has never been a sentencing option for mandatory death 
offences since the original enactment of the Probation of 
Offenders Ordinance (Ordinance 27 of 1951).
Following the reasoning in Fairuuz, offences which now 
carry discretionary death are arguably offences which 
carry a “specifi ed minimum sentence” – the Court has the 
discretion to prescribe imprisonment, but does not have the 
discretion as to its minimum quantum (which is life). These 
offences are no longer offences the sentences of which are 
“fi xed by law”. While the inherent nature of these offences 
is highly likely to militate against the granting of probation 
orders in the fi rst place, it remains possible for the Court to 
grant probation to a youth offender who has committed one 
of these offences. 
Was that the legislative intent when discretionary death 
sentences were introduced?
Th e Way Forward
It is timely for the law on probation to be reviewed – 
and this is not a lone view. In 2006, a commentator had 
observed that it was not “valid to assume that an offence 
is ‘serious’ just because it is either a specifi ed minimum 
offence or a mandatory minimum offence”. More recently, a 
commentator suggested that the legislature could consider 
either removing the proviso to s 5 of the POA completely, 
or review the offences which carry specifi ed or mandatory 
minimum sentences.
The complete abolition of the proviso to s 5 of the POA alone 
may create uncertainty and confusion.  One could expect 
defence counsel to seek a probation order in almost every 
other case.  It may also be impractical (at least in the short 
term) for the legislature to prescribe whether probation is a 
sentencing option for each and every offence.
While the notion of giving the Court wider discretion in 
sentencing is generally laudable, there should be a set 
of legislative criteria or guidelines to determine when and 
how the power to grant probation ought to be exercised. 
Bearing in mind the close relationship between the criteria 
for community sentences (under s 337 of the CPC) and the 
criteria for probation (under s 5 of the POA), an exhaustive 
and comparative analysis of how the POA should be 
reformed merits another article by itself. Nevertheless, the 
legislature could consider several suggestions in any reform 
to s 5 of the POA.
One possible reform is to amend s 5 such that probation 
is generally available for all offences (except for offences 
punishable with death or offences punishable with life 
imprisonment). However, for offences with a specifi ed or 
mandatory minimum sentence of fi ne, imprisonment or 
caning exceeding specifi c quantum levels, only fi rst time 
youth offenders are eligible. In this way, the legislature can 
use the quantum levels as a more accurate proxy to calibrate 
and indicate the “seriousness” of offences with specifi ed or 
mandatory minimum sentences. This suggestion may be 
preferred if the legislature takes the view that most offences 
with specifi ed or mandatory minimum sentences are indeed 
relatively serious in nature. The main defi ciency of this 
suggestion is that some relatively serious offences may 
not carry a specifi ed or mandatory minimum sentence in 
the fi rst place – the Courts would still have the power to 
grant probation for such offences. However, the legislature 
may take the view that the starting point should be to grant 
greater, rather than lesser, sentencing discretion to the 
Courts.  
Alternatively, the legislature could abandon the use 
of specifi ed or mandatory minimum sentences in s 5. 
Section 5 can simply prescribe that probation is generally 
available for all offences (except for offences punishable 
with death or offences punishable with life imprisonment). 
However, for offences which are punishable with a term 
of fi ne, imprisonment or caning which exceeds specifi c 
quantum levels, only fi rst time youth offenders are eligible. 
This concept is not unique: under s 337(1)(i) of the CPC, 
community sentences are generally not available as a 
sentencing option for offences which are punishable with a 
term of imprisonment which exceeds three years.  
One defi ciency of this suggestion is that it may be too blunt, 
and may not capture certain offences the seriousness of 
which may be expressed by the legislature through the 
mandatory nature of fi ne, incarceration or caning, rather 
than the quantum of the sentence. A via media to mitigate 
this defi ciency could be a hybrid of the two solutions above: 
Probation is generally available for all offences (except for 
offences punishable with death or offences punishable with 
life imprisonment).  However, for offences which are: (i) 
punishable with a term of fi ne, imprisonment or caning which 
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exceeds specifi c quantum levels; or (ii) carry a mandatory 
minimum sentence of fi ne, imprisonment or caning which 
exceeds specifi c quantum levels (which would be lower 
than those in the preceding category), only fi rst time youth 
offenders are eligible.
Finally, s 337 of the CPC sets out in some detail both the 
types of offences, as well as the types of offenders for 
which community sentences would not be a sentencing 
option. Section 5 of the POA may benefi t from a similar 
architecture.
Conclusion
The balance to be struck in any reform exercise to s 5 of the 
POA is one where, as a starting point, the Courts should be 
given as much sentencing discretion as possible, especially 
in relation to fi rst time youth offenders. At the same time, 
there needs to exist a careful calibration of the offences that 
are deemed relatively serious enough to preclude probation 
as a sentencing option. Regardless of any eventual reform 
adopted by the legislature, the objective of the foregoing 
analysis is to set out a conceptual framework to aid the 
legislature in achieving this diffi cult and delicate balance.
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Recent Amendment to the Singapore 
Companies Act: Buyout Remedy in Section 
254(1)(i) – a Shifting Paradigm?
In a bid to maintain Singapore’s competitiveness in this 
rapidly evolving business landscape, the Ministry of 
Finance established a high-level Steering Committee 
back in October 2007 to carry out a fundamental review 
of the Singapore’s Companies Act.1 This exemplifi es 
Singapore’s pragmatic efforts at improving the regulatory 
and governance framework to keep Singapore’s reputation 
as an international fi nancial hub on the cutting edge of the 
business landscape.2
 
This article focuses the spotlight on one of the recent key 
amendments to the Singapore Companies Act pursuant 
to the Companies (Amendment) Bill which was passed 
in Parliament in October 2014 – the introduction of a 
buyout remedy for winding-up applications under s 254(1)
(i). The underlying consideration behind this amendment 
is an attempt to avoid “practical injustice”, by conferring 
the Courts with the fl exibility to order a share buyout 
instead of a winding-up in cases where companies are 
still economically viable notwithstanding the breakdown in 
relationship between shareholders. The aim is to achieve a 
fairer and more effi cient solution for the majority to buyout 
the minority if the Court is of the opinion that it is “just and 
equitable” to do so. However, would this change signal a 
shift in paradigm for our shareholders’ rights regime?
When the relationship between shareholders of a company 
has irretrievably broken down, the two main statutory exit 
mechanisms commonly resorted to are ss 216 and 254(1)(i) 
which aggrieved parties often plead for relief in the alternative 
in the hope of boosting their chances of success. The 
previous decision of Sim Yong Kim v Evenstar Investments 
Pte Ltd (“Evenstar”)3 provides useful clarifi cations with 
respect to the conceptual basis on which relief might be 
granted under each section. Notwithstanding the overlap in 
their scope and remedial powers, the Court also reminded 
us that both sections should nevertheless be regarded as 
distinct jurisdictions. Essentially, s 254(1)(i) is a broader 
jurisdiction (to the exclusion of s 216) covering situations 
involving fault-neutral deadlock amongst shareholders. 
However, the harsh remedy of a winding-up would not seem 
justifi able if the company remains commercially viable and 
where it may be a more effi cient solution for a share buyout 
instead. Evidently, the recent amendment to s 254(1)(i) 
seeks to plug this unsatisfactory gap in the law. 
As a matter of statutory construction, the present s 254(1)
(i) restricts the remedial powers of the Court by limiting 
the remedy to solely a winding-up order. This limited 
discretion regrettably ties the Courts’ hands when often 
times a more practical remedy may be to order a buyout 
of shares instead. However, we should also be alive to 
the possible implications of this amendment on the holistic 
statutory framework that governs shareholders’ rights. 
Taking into account the interrelationship between ss 254(1)
(i) and 216 and their respective functions, the insertion of a 
buyout remedy in s 254(1)(i) (which was primarily intended 
to deal with winding-up) may risk confl ating both sections 
This article focuses the spotlight on one of the recent key amendments to the 
Singapore Companies Act – the introduction of a buyout remedy for winding-up 
applications under section 254(1)(i). How would this change affect our shareholders’ 
rights regime moving forward?
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and present conceptual and practical diffi culties which 
the Courts would subsequently have to grapple with. This 
could also lead to an unwarranted remedy arbitrage and 
procedural issues, as will be discussed subsequently in this 
article.  
While the amendment to s 254(1)(i) seeks to address 
certain practical considerations, there remains, however, 
a troubling tension of preserving a fl exible jurisdiction for 
the Courts to do practical justice and while ensuring greater 
certainty in the law. To this end, this article proposes an 
alternative perspective to consider amending the scope of s 
216 to encompass instances  of fault-neutral deadlock in the 
management of the company as well, and instead confi ne 
the use of s 254(1)(i) to genuine winding-up applications 
only.  Additionally, this article also reconsiders the practicality 
of “shot-gun” clauses in shareholder agreements to deal 
with deadlock amongst shareholders. 
Unravelling the Relationship – Twins or Cousins?
Historical Development 
In Singapore, our laws relating to minority protection are 
generally found under s 216 (the “oppression” jurisdiction) 
and s 254(1)(i) (the “just and equitable” jurisdiction) of 
the Singapore Companies Act. Both sections are exit 
mechanisms commonly resorted to by aggrieved parties 
pursuant to which a Court may order a winding up of a 
company, whereas in contrast to the UK statutory regime,4 
winding up is available as a remedy solely under the UK 
equivalent “just and equitable” jurisdiction. Unlike the 
Singapore Companies Act, there is a more apparent 
distinction between the "oppression jurisdiction" and the 
"just and equitable" jurisdiction equivalent under the UK 
statutory regime. 
As a preliminary point, it would be useful for us to draw 
reference from the equivalent UK provisions from which our 
local laws are modeled after so as to better appreciate the 
rationale and inter-relationship between s 216 and s 254(1)
(i). 
The birth of the equivalent “oppression remedy”5 in the UK 
came about when the Cohen Committee,6 back in 1945, 
designed a statutory remedy against the oppression of 
minority shareholders in the form of s 210 of the Companies 
Act 1948,7 which was subsequently replaced with the 
statutory predecessor of ss 459-4618 (equivalent to our s 
216) that considerably widened the scope of this alternative 
remedy then.9 Following this change, the phrase “oppressive 
conduct” in the previous s 210 was replaced with a more 
liberal and fl exible requirement of “unfairly prejudicial” 
conduct. The objective was to remove any likely restrictive 
interpretation, and to decouple the “oppression” remedy 
from its historical attachment to the “just and equitable” 
winding-up provision as its predecessor had been. 
It was also the traditional reluctance of the Courts to wind 
up a company that led to the development of the statutory 
“oppression” remedy to allow Courts to resolve intra-
corporate disputes without resorting to a winding up under 
the “just and equitable” ground.10 Ordering a winding up 
was akin to pronouncing a death sentence on the Company. 
In fact, it was also provided by s 225(2) of the 1948 Act11 
then, that winding up orders must be a last resort and 
only when there are no suitable alternative remedies. This 
"oppression" remedy was envisioned as a broader and 
more fl exible remedy that was more appropriate to deal 
with a range of ‘reprehensible’ conduct in corporate affairs 
to achieve practical justice.
An Asymmetrical Relationship – Overlapping but 
Distinct Sections
While both ss 254(1)(i) and 216 occupy distinct realms in the 
Singapore’s Companies Act and have their own respective 
scope of application, it is apparent that these two sections 
do overlap to some extent since the object of both sections 
is to remedy any form of unfair conduct.12 Despite the 
overlapping rationales, the Court in the decision of Evenstar 
also took the opportunity13 to clarify the distinct conceptual 
basis for relief under each section. 
Following Chan CJ’s (as he was then) analysis in Evenstar, 
while the application of equitable principles exists in both 
ss 254(1)(i) and 216 to remedy unfair conduct on the part 
of controlling shareholders, they were never intended to 
be coterminous jurisdictions. Where the two jurisdictions 
do in fact overlap, Singapore’s position is in consensus 
with Parker J’s dictum in Re Guidezone Ltd14 that in order 
to reconcile the concurrent jurisdictions under the two 
sections in a principled manner, “the degree of unfairness 
required to invoke the ‘just and equitable’ jurisdiction should 
be as onerous as that required to invoke the ‘oppression’ 
jurisdiction”.
The distinction arises, however, as a matter of statutory 
construction and where we compare the scope of their 
applications. A plain reading suggests that the Court’s 
jurisdiction under s 254(1)(i) may be broader than that under 
s 216 in certain cases15 and as succinctly suggested in 
Palmer’s Company Law, it appears that s 254(1)(i) is wider 
because mere proof of a breakdown of trust and confi dence 
may be enough to ground the winding-up remedy.16 
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Additionally, instances of fault-neutral deadlock amongst 
shareholders may only fall under s 254(1)(i), but the same 
facts may not amount to oppressive or unfair conduct on 
the part of controlling shareholders that is commonly dealt 
with under s 216. When dealing with deadlock amongst 
shareholders, it ought to be recognized that the inequity or 
unfair prejudice does not lie in the oppressive or wrongful 
conduct of the other shareholder(s) in the management of 
the company or the conduct of its affairs per se, but in the 
opposing shareholders’ insistence on locking the applicant 
shareholder in the company despite the stalemate they 
have reached concerning the conduct of the company’s 
business. 
In fact, a plain reading of ss 254(1)(i) and 216 draws a 
reasonable conclusion that relief under each section is 
founded on different bases. Presently, an application under 
s 254(1)(i) only affords a petitioner a winding up order, 
whereas a successful application under s 21617 gives the 
Court a wide discretion to make any order as it thinks fi t.18 
Having said that, what amounts to commercial unfairness 
under s 216 is based upon rational principles and subject 
to the facts of each case to prevent “palm tree” justice. A 
winding up order against an operational and viable company 
under s 216 is usually only granted as a last resort and if 
the state of affairs cannot be remedied by any other means 
(such as a shares buyout).19  
While both sections overlap in scope and remedial powers, 
it is crucial that our statutory laws governing shareholders’ 
rights remain principled and rational, so that potential 
applicants may have a better appreciation of the different 
circumstances which each section should be intended to 
address.
Potential Roadblocks Ahead20
Winding up a solvent and viable company is indisputably 
a harsh and drastic measure to take and this invariably 
compromises the economic interests of all shareholders 
including other corporate stakeholders involved.21 Section 
254(1)(i) provides that the Court may order a company to 
be wound up if the Court is of the opinion that it is “just 
and equitable” to do so. This confers a wide and unfettered 
discretion to wind up a company provided that it would be 
“just and equitable” to do so. Paradoxically, s 254(1)(i) has 
been aptly described as a provision that covers a multitude 
of sins.22 On its face, while the section deals with a multitude 
of conduct, the sole remedy available under s 254(1)(i) is a 
winding up order. The lack of remedial discretion under s 
254(1)(i) practically ties the Courts’ hands to a winding up 
remedy. This is hardly a satisfactory result, especially when 
the company concerned is a fl ourishing one. 
Previous seminal cases in Singapore23 have illustrated that 
such challenges are not merely hypothetical and Judges24 
often have to resort to judicial techniques to “soften” the 
harshness of a winding up order by exercising its powers to 
make interim orders under s 257(1) of the Companies Act 
– to stay the execution of the Order until the parties have 
had an opportunity to negotiate a practical compromise 
and reach a mutually acceptable solution to their dispute 
which typically results in a buyout of shares. Such interim 
orders attempt to temper any inequity that may ensue from 
a winding up and also balances the interests of all the 
stakeholders including the Company’s. 
Following the amendments, the provision of a buyout remedy 
under s 254(1)(i) attempts to expand the limited remedial 
discretion that our Courts presently struggle with. However, 
the benefi t of remedial fl exibility must be balanced against 
the notion of legal certainty. This article suggests that the 
potential benefi ts of allowing Courts to order a buyout under 
s 254(1)(i) may be outweighed by three potential problems.
Remedy Arbitrage
First, inserting a buyout remedy under s 254(1)(i) could 
likely result in “remedy-shopping” and arbitrage between 
ss 254(1)(i) and 216 leading to greater uncertainty in our 
shareholder’s rights regime. Maintaining a clear distinction 
in the types of relief that may be obtained under each section 
prevents either from being rendered superfl uous. Given that 
s 254(1) deals with a broader range of situations as compared 
to s 216 (ie restricted to commercial unfairness), aggrieved 
shareholders may, following the changes, strategically opt 
to bring oppression-style cases under s 254(1)(i) (in the 
hope of obtaining a buyout order) rather than s 216 leading 
to an undesirable migration of oppression-style cases from 
the former to the latter section. 
  
Typically for applications under s 216, where a winding 
up is unlikely to be ordered as an appropriate remedy, a 
concurrent winding up application under s 254(1)(i) is 
less theoretically defensible. The “clean hands” doctrine 
impugns bad-faith applications and prevents applicants 
from bypassing the more appropriate remedies available 
under s 216. The amendments to s 254(1)(i) however cast a 
smokescreen and “masks” potential vexatious applications, 
blurring the distinction between bona fi de and bad faith 
winding up applications.
Procedural Eff ects
Second, allowing Courts to order a buyout under s 254(1)
(i) may result in unintended procedural problems caused 
by inserting a buyout remedy into a part of the Companies 
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Act that is primarily intended to deal with winding up 
applications. As discussed above, it is likely that aggrieved 
shareholders will opt to bring their claims under s 254(1)
(i) and a spiteful applicant may seek to take advantage of 
the potential inconvenience and disruption that a winding 
up application may cause to a company to put maximum 
pressure on the counter parties into a disadvantageous 
buyout or exit. 
As far as operational and successful companies are 
concerned, aggrieved shareholder(s) would be seeking 
a buyout remedy and not a winding up. However, once 
an application for a winding up under section 254(1)(i) is 
made, the company in question is invariably subject to 
the winding up regime of the Companies Act.25 Upon the 
commencement of a winding up application, the Companies 
Act imposes certain disabilities and inconveniences upon 
the company.26 In particular, s 259 of the Companies Act 
provides that any disposition of the company’s property 
made after the commencement of the winding up is void 
unless the Court orders otherwise. This has adverse effects 
on third parties such as creditors and suppliers, who may 
refrain from dealing with a company that is the subject of 
a winding up application. This may also result in unfair and 
costly consequences for companies that are the subject of 
s 254(1)(i) oppression-style claims but are unlikely to be 
wound up. 
A winding up application will inadvertently attract unwanted 
and negative publicity27 as a mere application under s 
254(1)(i) may lead to the impression that the company is 
insolvent or under fi nancial diffi culty. This precipitates a 
loss of confi dence on the part of creditors, customers and 
even employees. The Court of Appeal has recognised 
and guarded against such unfairness by fi nding that s 216 
petitions, even if a winding up is one of the remedies being 
sought, should not be considered winding up petitions.28
Tipping the Framework Balance? – Majority Rule 
vs Minority Rights
Third, inserting a buyout remedy under s 254(1)(i) may disrupt 
the statutory framework that governs our shareholders’ rights 
regime, and risks opening the fl oodgates. It is a delicate 
balance between de facto majority rule and the protection 
of minority shareholders’ rights under our Companies Act 
framework. The current wording of s 254(1)(i) maintains this 
balance by allowing Courts to protect minority shareholders 
in an almost unlimited set of circumstances (ie just and 
equitable considerations) while restricting the remedy 
available to only a winding up order. 
On the other hand, s 216 allows the Court to order an 
expansive range of remedies as it thinks fi t for alleged conduct 
that falls under the ambit and parameters of “commercial 
unfairness” only29 as the Court determines based on the 
facts of each case. Limiting the remedial options available 
and to only genuine winding up applications under s 254(1)
(i) has been critical in preventing a fl ood of frivolous minority 
claims. 
The potential roadblocks of an untested version of s 254(1)
(i) may translate to a heightened sense of uncertainty 
if oppression-style cases “migrate” over to the “just and 
equitable” winding up jurisdiction. Afterall, it is preferable that 
lawyers should be able to advise their clients with greater 
certainty whether or not a petition is either appropriate and/
or likely to succeed.30 The challenge ahead lies in balancing 
a broad and fl exible jurisdiction for the Court to do justice 
while maintaining certainty and predictability in the law in a 
judicious manner. 
Rethinking the Amendments – a Possible 
Alternative?
While it is possible that instances of fault-neutral deadlock 
may on certain occasions warrant the winding up of the 
company under s 254(1)(i), it is less clear whether such 
cases should necessarily be confi ned to this section 
exclusively, considering that both sections’ objectives are to 
remedy unfairness. The challenge of isolating fault-neutral 
deadlock situations (which does not amount to commercial 
unfairness) under s 254(1)(i) may result in “practical 
injustice” for the reasons discussed above.
Section 216 – Time for a Makeover?
This article proposes an alternative perspective of rewording 
s 216 to facilitate a more comprehensive framework. 
The present wording of s 216 regrettably confi nes the 
conception of "unfairness" to specifi c categories of conduct 
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concerning: (i) the conduct of the company’s affairs or the 
exercise of director’s powers in a manner that is oppressive; 
and (ii) the acts of the company or resolutions by members 
or debenture holders which unfairly discriminates against 
or prejudices.31 Rather than distinguishing one ground 
from the other, this traditional categorical phrasing ought 
to be abandoned.32 Afterall, it may not be in the Court’s 
best interest to have detailed guidelines as to do so may 
result in “satellite litigation”, which may be used to mount 
challenges against the Court’s judicial discretion, and 
otherwise constrain discretion since each case is unique. 
As was reiterated by the Court in Over & Over Ltd v Bonvest 
Holdings Ltd,33 afterall the ultimate litmus test is one of 
“commercial unfairness” in determining whether a set of 
facts, which differs from case to case, may be found under 
s 216. 
It is proposed that s 216 could be worded as a single broad 
test of commercial unfairness, the purpose of which is to 
identify conduct which offends the standards of commercial 
fairness, standards of fair dealing and conditions of fair 
play33 which enjoins the Courts to intervene. This attempts 
to broaden the conception of commercial unfairness to 
allow the Courts to adequately deal with unfair prejudice 
arising from instances of fault-neutral deadlock34 between 
shareholders of companies that are still viable and 
operational under s 216 instead of s 254(1)(i) which is 
commonly pleaded under as well.
216 – (1) Any member or holder of a debenture of a 
company or, in the case of a declared company under 
Part IX…
that the affairs of the company are being conducted 
or the powers of the directors are being exercised in 
a manner oppressive …or in disregard of his or their 
interests as members…of the Company; or
that some act of the company has been done or is 
threatened or that some resolution of the members, 
holders of debentures…which unfairly discriminates…
or is otherwise prejudicial to one or more of the 
members…
…[to insert and replace with ]…
that the affairs or conduct of the company, have 
been carried out or results in… which unfairly 
prejudices the interests of certain members to the 
extent that it would offend the reasonable standards 
of commercial fairness …
The above illustrates a proposed amended s 216 where 
the language of “unfairly prejudice” attempts to expand 
the scope of application, to include instances of deadlock 
amongst shareholders. In such instances, the unfair 
prejudice could arguably arise from the majority’s conduct in 
maintaining or insisting on the association despite changed 
circumstances. This also recognises that commercial 
unfairness does not arise only out of a failure to comply with 
prior agreements or expectations and may also “spring” 
into existence where circumstances have changed so as 
to involve situations not covered by previous arrangements 
and understanding (such as fault-neutral deadlock leading 
to an irretrievable breakdown in relationship).36 
Accordingly, a winding up order under s 254(1)(i) should 
always be considered a remedy of last resort and, in light of 
the problems highlighted above, be confi ned to genuine and 
legitimate winding up applications only – specifi cally where 
there has been an irretreviable breakdown in relationship 
between the shareholders and where there is no longer any 
commercial intention or justifi able reasons to sustain the 
commercial business of the company. 
Revisiting “Shotgun” Claus es
Another possible alternative to consider is the function 
of “shotgun” clauses in shareholder or joint venture 
agreements. A shotgun clause is a form of ex ante exit 
mechanism which usually stipulates that a party has the 
right to offer one’s shares to another party at a particular 
fair price. In the event the offeree decides against buying 
the offered shares at such price, following which, the 
offeror is obliged to buy over the offeree’s shares at the 
same specifi ed price. The key characteristic of this is that 
the shareholder making the initial offer sets the price and 
terms, while the other shareholder receiving the offer gets 
to choose whether to sell or buy at that price and on those 
terms. This mechanism keeps the shareholder who triggers 
the shotgun clause honest when setting the offer price and 
payment terms since one cannot be certain whether the 
initial offered shares at such terms would be rejected.
 
However, in a scenario of multiple shareholders or where 
there are majority and minority shareholders, the minorities 
are likely to be constrained by limited fi nancial resources. 
For example in a 90/10 scenario, the 10 per cent minority 
shareholder(s) will have to come up with at least nine times 
as much money as the other 90 per cent shareholder(s) if 
the former wishes to trigger the shotgun clause.37
Ultimately, the goal towards a fair, effi cient, no-fault 
corporate divorce will be a challenge in practice.
Conclusion
As with any new initiative, the amendments introduced 
in the Companies (Amendment) Bill bring with it novel 
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questions and challenges that may not lend themselves to 
obvious answers, at any rate not when the amendments are 
still at its nascent stage. Pragmatic considerations underlie 
this particular amendment to confer Courts with greater 
remedial powers in hearing winding up applications in order 
to do practical justice. However, potential problems of this 
amendment to s 254(1)(i) could shake up our foundations 
of certainty and predictability, which nevertheless, is a sine 
qua non to the effi cacy of our shareholders’ rights regime. 
Moreover, the insertion of a buyout remedy under s 254(1)
(i) would be noted as an idiosyncratic and unprecedented 
deviation from other common law jurisdictions which 
Singapore has traditionally modeled its shareholders’ regime 
closely after and is likely to result in greater uncertainties 
moving forward. 
An overly liberal remedial discretion must be eschewed, lest 
the structure and integrity of our shareholders’ rights regime 
be undermined. Moving forward, if Singapore is to retain 
its reputation as a reliable and effi cient fi nancial hub, our 
legal framework must better manage the balance between 
majority rule and the protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights to promote a conducive business environment for 
companies to operate in. Whatever the relative merits and 
justifi cations of this amendment may be, the least we need 
is a disruptive shift in paradigm for our shareholders’ rights 
regime.
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abundantly clear to us that proceedings instituted under s 216 of the Companies Act 
are not in truth winding-up proceedings – certainly not winding-up proceedings under 
Part X of the Act – even if a winding-up order is expressly asked for in such proceedings 
…”.
29 Refer to Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 776.
30 Th e UK Company Law Reform Steering Group has concluded that on balance, the 
benefi ts of certainty outweighed the risk of injustice in periphery cases: See Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure (UK, Department 
of Trade and Industry, Consultation Document of the Company Law Reform Steering 
Group, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi  ce, November 2000) at paras 5.78-5.81 
[Completing the Structure].
31 See s 216(1)(a) and (b), Companies Act.
32 See also Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2007), 
Margaret Chew rightly points out that (at pp 120-121): … any exercise in further 
defi ning or refi ning each of the expressions “oppression”, “disregard of interests”, 
“unfair discrimination” or “prejudice”, in order to ascertain any diff erences in their 
meaning and application looks to be a frustrating one. It would be futile, if not 
impossible, to split pedantic hairs over the precise and exact meaning of the medley 
phraseology favoured by the legal draughtsman. Th e fruit of such labour could only 
add uncertainty and confusion.
33 [2010] 2 SLR 776.
34 Re Tri-Circle Investment Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 441.
35 Deadlock does not mean a temporary impasse. Th e deadlock must be on-going to 
justify such an order being made; See Re Cappuccitti Potato Co. [1972] O.J. No. 536, 
17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 213 (H.C.J); a single instance or isolated instances of disagreement 
do not aff ord suffi  cient grounds.  Th ere must be such a suffi  ciently serious disagreement 
that it would not be reasonable to believe that the shareholders will resolve their 
diff erences and co-operate in the running of the corporation; See Prussin v Park 
Distributors Inc. (1963), 6. C.B.R. (N.S.) 31 (Que. S.C.).
36 Re Metropolis Motorcycles Ltd., at [90] (emphasis added).
37 Phil Th omson, “Shotgun clauses and Owner Managers: Limitations and Alternatives”; 
Business Lawyer, Corporate Counsel; available at: <http://www.thompsonlaw.ca/
pdf_folder/Shotgun_2004.pdf>.
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Our Time with the Pro Bono Services Offi  ce 
During the months of February to April 2014, the Pro Bono 
Services Offi ce (“PBSO”) was inundated with requests from 
students from the NUS/NYU double-degree program. Over the 
course of one year, students were able to earn two LLM degrees 
from New York University (“NYU”) and the National University 
of Singapore (“NUS”), and become qualifi ed to sit the New 
York Bar exam. The program was highly regarded and recently 
fi nished with its fi nal batch of students approaching the PBSO 
to volunteer their skills. The NYU@NUS program produced 
outstanding graduates who sought to thrive in their chosen 
fi elds of endeavour around the globe. The program took great 
pride and satisfaction in delivering a global legal education that 
combines the best of what the USA and Singapore had to offer.
As a result, the fi nal batch of NUS/NYU students came 
looking to complete their mandatory 50 hours of pro bono 
work before shipping out to New York for the fi nal stage of 
their double masters. Over the course of several months, the 
PBSO became a temporary home to a dozen highly qualifi ed 
and intelligent soon-to-be international lawyers from all around 
the world. The students proved themselves to be invaluable, 
bringing new knowledge and insight to the PBSO, as well as 
teaching themselves the intricacies of how legal aid and law 
awareness is delivered in Singapore.
I was proud to be the direct supervisor to these students and 
found their overwhelming enthusiasm to contribute to PBSO 
projects to be inspiring. I was also very impressed by the gusto 
the students took towards drafting content for our Community 
Legal Clinic Manual, despite its excessive length and at times, 
dry content. The volunteers spent a considerable amount 
of time at the PBSO hunched over their laptops furiously 
researching and writing content for the FAQs we had sourced 
from the public.  Their contributions have both deepened the 
content of our CLC manual, as well as made it targeted and 
streamlined. The results will speak for themselves over the next 
few months.
It is a shame that the NUS/NYU program is no longer being 
continued, as the contributions of these students to the PBSO 
were incredibly helpful, and hopefully we will continue to receive 
volunteers of such high calibre in the future.
After fi nishing their studies here in Singapore, I requested that 
some of the students update me on their progress as well as 
write a simple refl ection piece, so that others can gain insight 
on what they learnt in their time with us.
Patrick Onyemaechi Kainz
NUS LLM Candidate (2014), Austria
I was very happy to get a pro bono attachment with the PBSO 
in December 2013 and March 2014 while I was studying for my 
Master of Laws at the National University of Singapore.
 
I have come to understand that the PBSO fulfi ls a very 
important role in facilitating access to the law for the general 
public in Singapore. Their publications and events are pursuing 
one important goal: Informing lay people of their rights so that 
they can make self-determined decisions in their everyday life 
without the fear of getting caught up in “legalese”. 
During my time with the PBSO, I have assisted in drafting a 
recommendation for implementing a legal framework for social 
enterprises. Also, I was engaged in fi le review for the legal 
clinics in which attorneys offered free advice to clients in family, 
civil, criminal and employment law. Furthermore, I contributed 
to an update of the legal manual for the family law clinics. This 
manuscript will allow lawyers to respond to the most common 
questions faster. 
My attachment with the PBSO has allowed me to work in fi elds 
of law to which I had rarely gotten any exposure before. It was 
an enriching experience to see that my knowledge of the law 
will also allow me to venture into new legal fi elds. Over and 
beyond anything else however, my attachment with the PBSO 
has given me the feeling that I could give something back to 
Singapore and its people, which have shown me such great 
hospitality.
Fernando J. Marranzini
NUS LLM Candidate (2014), Dominican Republic
“Pro bono” work is, fi rst and foremost, a chance to selfl essly 
exercise the legal skills attained after many years of study and 
practice, for the benefi t of others. My work with the Law Society 
of Singapore’s Pro Bono Services Offi ce consisted primarily 
of updating the “Bankruptcy” Chapter of the Community 
Legal Clinic Manual, affording me with a great opportunity to 
familiarise myself with an area of the law which had always 
piqued my interest but had so far eluded the scope of my 
professional practice: insolvency law. 
The work turned out to be a professionally enriching experience 
through which I was able to gain knowledge of the legal 
framework governing bankruptcy procedures in Singapore and 
the roles played by the different actors in the process: creditors, 
debtors, guarantors and public institutions. Moreover, the work 
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was personally enriching in that I knew my contributions to the 
Manual might one day positively impact the legal situation of a 
person in need who looks to the Pro Bono Services Offi ce for 
assistance. 
Yasuyuki Suzuki
NUS LLM Candidate (2014), Japan
PBSO gives me a chance to get in closer touch with general 
people in trouble. At the PBSO, I contributed for revising the 
legal guide book, for the part of making a will and probate of 
a will of that book. I had a chance to attend a free legal clinic. 
Through the work of revising the material, I found differences 
in legal framework of inheritance law from the one in my home 
country. Especially, the treatment of the Corporate Provident 
Fund is based on the social welfare system in Singapore and 
seems very unique to me. What was more interesting for me 
was the free legal clinic. 
When I was working in Japan as a lawyer, I handled similar 
tasks several times. However, in the clinic at Pro Bono Services 
Offi ce, I could change my stance to an assistant and observe 
people coming there for consultation closer. I could also see 
how lawyers were careful in handling with people’s concerns. I 
will try to act in the same manner when I consult with individuals 
for their personal problems next time. In short, pro bono work 
was a very good chance to refresh my mind and rethink about 
fundamental duty as a legal professional: giving a hand to 
people in trouble and support their life. I want to keep working 
for public interests in any forms once I go back to practice.
Michele Terlizzese
NUS LLM Candidate (2014), Italy
Pro bono work is unpaid and I had always thought it sounded 
like an oxymoron. Moreover, since I graduated in law, I have 
simply been too busy to think about anything else but my 
career. These are the main reasons for which I hadn’t thought 
about doing something like that in my Country, before coming 
to Singapore.
In Singapore, for various reasons, I was forced to do some pro 
bono work to comply with a mandatory requirement to enroll in 
a certain Bar. The work I performed at the Law Society PBSO 
consisted in making legal research and drafting the chapter on 
Family Law of the Community Legal Clinic Manual.
This made sense once I assisted legal clinics sessions and 
helped lawyers in making records while they were advising on 
relevant legal issues (eg contract of employment, contract of 
work, wills, and defamation).  In fact, lawyers cannot be experts 
in all the sectors of the law and the referred Manual is indeed 
used by volunteer lawyers to provide free legal assistance 
during the Community Legal Clinic sessions.
Apart from learning about Singaporean Family Law, the 
characteristic that impressed me the most about pro bono work 
has been that I was actually helping people in need with my 
work, since I had never experienced such feeling working as a 
lawyer. After completing 50 hours of work I must say that I will 
never forget my pro bono experience and I am truly willing to 
repeat it again, once completed my LL.M. studies.
Primoz Sega
NUS LLM Candidate (2014), Slovenia
To put it fi rst, an experience with LawSoc PBSO was very 
pleasant and provided a good insight in pro bono work. The 
team in the offi ce was just great and very welcoming. 
Generally, to me the pro bono work means a way of giving 
back to the community a part of the educational privilege I was, 
fortunately, given. It also requires one to deal with areas of law 
not yet known to him before; the ones that most affect lives 
of regular people. Also, pro bono gives you certain pleasure 
of knowing that you are helping people who would otherwise 
never be able to retain legal services they so much need to 
protect their fundamental rights.
During my time with LawSoc PBSO, I dealt mostly with the civil 
law clinic. I came in touch with civil and family law of Singapore 
and, excitingly, also with Syariah law. In addition, I touched on 
Malaysian law as well.
I only attended one clinic; family clinic at the Family Court. I 
learned that the clients would often come in ill prepared or with 
a wrong perception of their case and merits they base it on. 
Often they are in distress and are not properly focused. While 
they often keep their own perception of the case, they also try 
to persuade a lawyer to agree with them and to show explicit 
approval for their, often wrong, legal reasoning. 
Besides the great coworkers, I will defi nitely remember the 
above mentioned clinic at the Family Court which gave me an 
opportunity to meet face to face with the people seeking advice.
Andrea Discepola
NYU Bar Exam Candidate, Canada
I’ve been volunteering with the Law Society’s Pro Bono 
Services Offi ce for the past fi ve months and have been involved 
in a variety of areas including the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme, 
Family Legal Clinics, Civil Legal Clinics, and a project aimed at 
the provision of free legal information to the public. The most 
interesting of these are the Family Legal Clinics. I aspire to be a 
family lawyer in Singapore and being involved in these clinics, 
meeting the clients, and listening to their stories has only re-
emphasised my desire to practise Family Law.  
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The most memorable Clinic was where we stayed behind with 
a client after the Clinic had ended to assist her further as her 
case was a cross-border issue and the welfare of the client and 
her infant were at stake. I hope to one day become a Singapore 
qualifi ed family lawyer so that I may volunteer my time at the 
Family Legal Clinics to inform people of their rights and how to 
safeguard them. The Law Society’s Pro Bono Services Offi ce 
provides an invaluable service and I’ve enjoyed my experience 
with them thus far.
Matthew Boyd
NY Bar Candidate, UK
In a time when people are struggling to make ends meet, I feel 
the provision of pro bono services is a critical activity which 
should be carried out by those who have greater means, as a 
way of giving back to their community.
The most rewarding part I found in undertaking pro bono work 
was the feeling that, even if you have only provided the slightest 
amount of help, what I have done has made a positive impact 
on somebody’s life. Furthermore, I found that it even assisted 
me in improving my lawyering ability!
In particular, through the nature of the legal matters which 
typically comprise pro bono, I was exposed to areas of law 
such as family law and criminal law, which I had not previously 
had so much knowledge about.
Although I see that the pro bono culture worldwide is not at 
the level it ought to be, I can certainly see an upward trend 
in people/companies who are embracing the ideas of what 
underpins the need for pro bono work in general: to ensure the 
person on the street is fully aware and confi dent in knowing and 
being able to enforce his/her legal rights. 
Although I have only recently been interested in participating 
in pro bono work, I can defi nitely see myself pursuing further 
pro bono projects and activities in the future. I would also 
encourage anybody who may be interested, but either does not 
know exactly the full scope of what pro bono services comprise 
or has not entered into the pro bono network to give it a try, and 
I am sure you will receive the same rewarding and enriching 
experience as I did!
Jean Ting
NY Bar Candidate, Singapore
Pro Bono work is a crucial, but often underappreciated, 
aspect of the legal services landscape. Participating in pro 
bono efforts prompted me to refl ect on the role of lawyers 
in addressing the everyday needs of the larger community. 
The values of fairness and justice that underpin the legal 
system can only truly be realised if all parties in disputes 
have the capabilities to advance their best case, which in 
turn requires access to resources. The Pro Bono Services 
Offi ce facilitates this through its range of schemes and 
programs targeted at individuals as well as community 
service organisations at various levels, and it fulfi lls the 
important role of matching their needs to law practices 
that have the interest and expertise to offer advice and 
assistance. 
In my time with the Pro Bono Services Offi ce, I have 
witnessed the passion and dedication of the staff and 
volunteers in furthering its mission. Through working to 
update the criminal law manual, I learnt that in addition to 
having knowledge about legal rules and doctrines, it is at 
least equally important to understand the nuts and bolts of 
the working systems and processes of the legal system. 
For instance, members of the public are more likely to 
ask questions about the process of fi ling a magistrate’s 
complaint or seek clarifi cations on arrest, custody and bail, 
than to ask questions about the content of legal rules at 
the preliminary stage. To begin to help them at all, having a 
grasp of these related processes is extremely important, but 
is often less explored in law school. 
It has also been eye-opening to learn about the schemes 
in place to assist charities and NGOs, such as Project 
Law Help and the Joint International Pro Bono Committee. 
Pro Bono efforts are often thought of in terms of assisting 
individuals, yet there is also signifi cant demand for 
assistance by non-profi t organisations, particularly in areas 
of corporate governance. By helping these organisations 
to become more fi nancially and operationally effi cient, they 
would in turn be better placed to further their public interest 
projects. In other words, Pro Bono work can not only help 
individuals directly in law-related issues, but can also help 
individuals indirectly on wider socio-economic dimensions 
through benefi tting community service organisations that 
advance these objectives. Thus, given the broad skillsets 
required by Pro Bono clients, there is surely some way that 
every lawyer can contribute regardless of their area of work. 
Overall, working at the Pro Bono Services Offi ce has a 
fruitful and humbling experience. I am inspired to continue 
to contribute in any way possible in the coming years, as 
part of my duty as a lawyer and more broadly, as a member 
of the Singaporean community. 
► Hugh Turnbull 
 Senior Executive Legal Officer
 Pro Bono Services Office
 The Law Society of Singapore
 E-mail: hugh @lawsoc.org.sg
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Lessons from My Parents
My parents celebrated their golden anniversary this 
month. During their celebratory party, it hit me that being 
married for 50 years is no mean feat. It is especially 
meaningful for a divorce lawyer who often sees marriages 
breaking up in less than fi ve years. 
How did they do it? My father was 24 and my mother was 16 
when they got match-made. They were distant relatives. He 
moved to Singapore from India at 19 to work and she, the 
eldest daughter in her family, was living in a small village, 
Seenamangalam in South India. They met each other for 
the fi rst time on their wedding day. After the marriage, she 
left behind her family in India and moved with her husband 
to Singapore. With no support system, they literally built 
their life here from scratch. 
I was the fi rst-born, when my mother was 17. Five years 
later and another three years after that, both my brothers 
came along. Though they had little in their early years, they 
gave the best to me and are responsible for who I am today. 
Their story is so similar to that of Singapore’s. It is fi tting that 
both are celebrating 50 years this year. 
Like many immigrants, Singapore was their transient 
home. They always spoke of “going back to their country”. 
However, the Singapore bug was infectious and they now 
say that they fi nd it diffi cult to adapt to life in India even 
on short holidays. My mother commented recently that 
she is grateful for the opportunity she had gotten to make 
Singapore her home. 
My parents have a fairy tale marriage. They are an example 
of the type of perfect marriage that one sees in movies. My 
brothers and I never saw or heard any unhappy exchanges 
or any misunderstandings between them. I grew up thinking 
that all marriages must be like that of my parents’. They set 
such high standards for me to follow. 
It was only much later that I realised that they made many 
sacrifi ces and compromises for each other. My parents 
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► Rajan Chettiar
 Rajan Chettiar LLC
 E-mail: rajan@rajanchettiar.com
are also the greatest communicators I know. They have 
so much to say to each other, and talk about anything and 
everything. When my father was still working, he would 
telephone my mother every day during his lunch hour and 
they would chat away. Even today, they would talk and talk 
to each other, from the moment they wake up till bedtime. 
In a recent television talk show, it was mentioned that 
marriage is just an opportunity for a couple to understand 
each other, something which they can never completely do. 
Marriages are delicate relationships, especially in today’s 
fast moving world. Relationships are diffi cult to maintain 
and require a lot of work. Many clients tell me that they and 
their spouses just drifted apart after marriage. 
Communication is such an important ingredient in a 
marriage and yet it is a most diffi cult skill to develop. It can 
cause many misunderstandings, break relationships and 
lead to divorces. Mental health professionals advocate 
that couples try to talk to each other about everything and 
anything, and not just about important matters such as 
fi nance, household matters and children. When a person 
is unable to communicate, apparently there are deeper 
psychological issues that he is facing.
In the same talk show that I saw, it was suggested that 
women have a lot of positive views and ideas which 
husbands should allow them to express. Equality must exist 
between a couple in a marriage. If it does not, the power 
imbalance slowly breaks down the marriage.
I remember assisting an elderly woman who was losing her 
battle to cancer to obtain a divorce. To my question why the 
divorce was important to her at this stage, she replied, “I 
want to die a free and peaceful woman”. 
My father is a quieter person than my mother. He also 
listens to her views. He regards her as an equal partner in 
the marriage. He used to come home after work to help take 
care of the children every day.
Many years ago, when I was congratulating a friend at his 
wedding, he replied that the marriage only starts the day 
after the celebrations. Marriage counsellors have remarked 
that couples put more work into their wedding celebrations 
than in their married life. The fi rst few years of a marriage 
are the most diffi cult as seen by the number of young 
marriages ending nowadays. The feeling of romance 
between a couple quickly wears off in a marriage once they 
have to juggle careers, run a household, manage extended 
families and raise children. 
The Wife and I crossed our tenth year of marriage this 
month. After going through many challenges and navigating 
around our differences, we feel we have had a really long 
marriage. On a number of occasions, we even had serious 
doubts about the survival of the marriage.
What kept us going was reminding ourselves that we loved 
and cared about each other a lot, over and above the 
problems we faced. We each also made big sacrifi ces to 
sustain the marriage. 
My parents love and care for each other very much in their 
own quiet ways. Poor health has infl icted my mother for the 
last 20 years. My father is always by her side to care for her 
and to accompany her for her medical appointments and 
various medical treatments. Recently, when my mother was 
taken ill during a holiday, he did not leave her side until she 
felt well enough to get out of bed. Again, another tall order 
for me to follow. 
The Wife deserves a lot of kudos. She puts up with the 
temperamental and moody side of me which most people 
do not know about. She is a full-time working wife and a full-
time home-maker. There is a running joke in our family that 
her total contributions to the marriage would bankrupt me in 
the event of a divorce. She is the rock in my life and I would 
not have made such progress in life without her. 
Being a family lawyer has made me appreciate the 
importance of marriage and the pitfalls to avoid. It teaches 
me how I should treat the Wife in our marriage. I also realise 
the importance of building a strong and resilient marriage 
through marriage preparation courses and counselling. The 
lessons I learnt in my own marriage also help me to be a 
more effective family lawyer. 
Finding the right partner, knowing them well, accepting 
them for what they are, appreciating the fact that marriage 
will not change them and being there for each other through 
thick and thin is the basic foundation of a lasting marriage. A 
lesson that my parents have taught me by example. 
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Arbitration in Singapore: A Practical Guide
International arbitration in Singapore has grown by leaps and 
bounds. SIAC has an active case load of 619. This book is a 
testimony to Singapore’s importance in the global arbitration 
arena.
This is a must-have book for anyone who wants to know and 
operate in the Singapore arbitral system. The panel of authors are 
the “who’s who” of the arbitral fraternity. This book is a practical 
guide which covers the procedural aspects of arbitration and also, 
focuses on arbitration in specifi c industries.
This book consists of 20 chapters. It begins with a historical 
overview of arbitration. The author covers the practice of 
arbitration from the Roman Empire, medieval England, France 
and Italy, and modern America. The signifi cant international 
documents; the Geneva Protocol and Convention, the New York 
Convention and the Model Law are also discussed. 
The next three chapters describe the role of the Court, the main 
features of arbitration and the legislative regime. Arbitration has 
been successful in Singapore because it has received strong 
support from the judiciary and Parliament. The Singapore Court 
of Appeal has announced that its role is to “support, and not to 
displace, the arbitral process”. In conjunction to that, on 9 January 
2014, the judiciary identifi ed specialist arbitration Judges, among 
who are Justices Judith Prakash, Belinda Ang and Vinodh 
Coomaraswamy. The legislative framework in Singapore for 
arbitration is primarily found in two statutes; the Arbitration Act, 
and the International Arbitration Act for the international forum. 
Chapter 5 analyses the confl ict of laws and the arbitral issues that 
arise from it. 
Chapters 6 to 14 deal with the arbitral process proper. Starting 
with the arbitration agreement, it chronologically describes each 
step in the proceedings. For example, how the appointment of 
the arbitrator is done, the requirements of the notice of arbitration, 
including amending and responding to the notice, and the 
recognition, enforcement and challenge of the arbitration award. 
The steps outline the practical considerations with existing 
literature for easy reference. For example, the case of PT First 
Media v Astro Nusantara International BV and others [2013] is 
analysed at length, providing a complete picture of the grounds on 
which a Court can refuse enforcement of a domestic international 
arbitration. The ends of Chapter 6 and Chapter 12 have samples 
of model arbitration clauses and award templates. 
The content of this book showcases step by step the workings 
of the arbitration process. It also offers a broad range of practical 
tips. For example, arbitrators should be aware that the principle of 
competence-competence has limited practicability in Singapore, 
and where such a ruling is made, it may be subject to review by 
the Singapore Court. It also highlights a suggestion made in other 
literature that the Singapore Courts have the power to order third 
party document production for arbitrations that have foreign seats. 
The fi nal fi ve chapters explain the practice of arbitration in specifi c 
industries: construction, intellectual property, domain name 
dispute resolution, shipping and international trade, oil and gas, 
and end with investment protection and international dispute 
resolution in Singapore.  
The Asia Pacifi c is growing in its reputation as the preferred 
arbitration venue. In that collective effort, Singapore has 
established itself as one of the preferred arbitral institutions 
for domestic and international arbitration. The index and the 
sequence of the topics make for easy reference for users of this 
guide. The contributors have simultaneously compiled a practical 
handbook and a research treatise. Consultation of this book to 
simplify diffi cult procedural or evidential decisions is well advised. 
For more information about Arbitration in Singapore: A Practical Guide or Sweet 
& Maxwell, visit http://www.sweetandmaxwellasia.com.sg/.
► Professor Datuk Sundra Rajoo
 Director
 Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration
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Pursuant to s 93(5) of the Legal Profession Act, the Council of the Law Society is 
required to publish the fi ndings and determination of the Disciplinary Tribunal in the 
Singapore Law Gazette or in such other media as the Council may determine to 
adequately inform the public of the same.
 
This summary is published pursuant to the requirement of s 93(5) of the Legal 
Profession Act.
Disciplinary Tribunal Report
In the Matter of Looi Wan Hui, an Advocate and 
Solicitor
The Disciplinary Tribunal found that the Respondent had 
conducted himself in a manner that amounts to a misconduct 
unbefi tting of an advocate and solicitor as an offi cer of the 
Supreme Court or member of an honourable profession 
within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 
(the “Act”).
The Respondent acted for the father-in-law (“Plaintiff’” 
of the Complainant’s sister (“Defendant”). The Plaintiff 
commenced action against the Defendant for return of 
his car, which the Defendant had been using. Following 
mediation, a settlement was reached and Final Judgment 
was entered, pursuant to which the Defendant was to 
pay the Plaintiff the sum of $24,800 in seven monthly 
installments. On 27 December 2012, the Complainant 
attended at the Respondent’s offi ce to deliver a cheque for 
the fi rst installment payment on behalf of the Defendant. 
There was an altercation between the Respondent and 
the Complainant. The Complainant lodged a complaint 
that the Respondent had confronted the Complainant in 
a threatening manner and had shouted abusive and/or 
threatening words. 
The following charge, pursuant to s 83(2)(h) of the Act, was 
preferred against the Respondent:
Charge 
“You, Looi Wan Hui, are charged that on 27th December 
2012, at about 11.00 am at 101 Upper Cross Street, #05-
56 People’s Park Centre, Singapore 059357 did conduct 
yourself in a manner that amounts to misconduct unbefi tting 
of an advocate and solicitor and offi cer of the Supreme 
Court or as a member of an honorable profession within 
the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 
(Cap 161), to wit-
a.  Charging at one Hun Sze Liang to confront him in a 
threatening manner and shouting the following abusive 
and/or threatening words or words to that effect:-
   ‛You and your sister lost this case. I will make you, 
your family and your sister all bankrupt’; and
b.  Saying words loudly to one Wee Pei Ling, Corrine for 
one Hun Sze Liang to hear:-
   ‛Make sure you bank in the cheque today. People 
like these are likely to have bounced cheques. They 
can’t afford to pay’
At the hearing, the Complainant and the Respondent gave 
their own versions of the event. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Society left it to the Disciplinary Tribunal to 
determine which version was more credible. 
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal
The Disciplinary Tribunal found that, though there was a 
heated argument between the parties, it was not established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent had 
“charged at the Complainant” and had confronted him in a 
threatening manner shouting, “You and your sister lost this 
case. I will make you, your family and your sister bankrupt” 
or words to that effect. The Disciplinary Tribunal opined that 
the Respondent would know that it was legally impossible 
to make the Complainant and his family a bankrupt as only 
the Defendant was liable to pay the judgment sum and may 
commence bankruptcy proceedings against her only if she 
defaulted. The Disciplinary Tribunal was, therefore, of the 
view that the Complainant’s version on this aspect was 
exaggerated and thus could not be accepted. 
The Disciplinary Tribunal then considered the evidence on 
the second allegation that the Respondent had said loudly to 
Wee Pei Ling, Corrine, (“Corrine”) and for the Complainant 
to hear, the words “Make sure you bank the cheque today. 
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People like these are likely to have bounced cheques. 
They can’t afford to pay”. The Disciplinary Tribunal found 
that before this statement was made there was already 
a heated argument and the Respondent did disengage 
himself from further arguments, did walk to his room and 
close the door and in the course of his return to his room did 
make the offensive statement for the Complainant to hear. 
The Disciplinary Tribunal considered Corrine’s evidence 
that the Complainant was very angry and “got riled up” 
but she could not really recall what the Respondent had 
said as she was busy writing the receipt for the installment 
payment. The Disciplinary Tribunal found it “odd” that she 
could not recall what the Respondent had said even though 
the statement was made to her but she could remember 
the Complainant’s reaction that he was very angry and 
riled. The Disciplinary Tribunal was of the view that such 
evidence, coming from essentially a non-independent 
witness called to give supportive evidence in favour of her 
employer, does provide some basis for the inference that 
in fact the Respondent must have made the statement to 
Corrine but loud enough for the Complainant to hear.  
Accordingly, the Disciplinary Tribunal found that the 
Respondent had made the statement as set out in paragraph 
(b) of the charge and determined that the Respondent had 
conducted himself in a manner that amounts to misconduct 
unbefi tting of an advocate and solicitor as an offi cer of the 
Supreme Court or member of an honourable profession 
within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Act. The Disciplinary 
Tribunal was mindful that it does not follow that once a 
fi nding that s 83(2)(h) of the Act had been made out, the 
matter should be referred for disciplinary action pursuant to 
s 93(1)(b) of the Act. Following the decision in Law Society 
of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani d/o Daniel [2010] 3 
SLR 390, a Disciplinary Tribunal ought to refer only matters 
of suffi cient gravity for disciplinary action in respect of 
serious cases. The Disciplinary Tribunal was of the view 
that there was no cause of suffi cient gravity for disciplinary 
action pursuant to s 93(1)(b) of the Act and determined 
that the Respondent be reprimanded by the Society for his 
misconduct and ordered that he pay $2,000 as contribution 
to part of the costs and disbursements to the Society. 
Th e Council’s Decision
Pursuant to s 94(3) of the Act Council has accepted 
the determination of the Disciplinary Tribunal and has 
reprimanded the Respondent for his misconduct.  
Invitation
for Contribution of Articles
The Singapore Law Gazette (“SLG????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??? ???????????? ????????? ???? ???????????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ?????????
?? ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
??????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????? ?????? ???????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????? ????? ???? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???? ???????? ??????????? ???? ?????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ???
???????????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ????
?????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
We look forward to hearing from you!
Please e-mail all enquiries, 
suggestions and submissions to 
Chandranie at  
chandranie@lexisnexis.com
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New Law Practices
Mr Tan Kai-Lit Melvin (formerly of 
Ascentsia Law Corporation) has 
commenced practice under the name and 
style of Kai Law Chambers on 2 January 
2015 at the following address and contact 
numbers:
151 Chin Swee Road
#03-21 Manhattan House
Singapore 169876
Tel: 6235 2418
Fax: 6235 2398
E-mail: kailawchambers@outlook.sg
Mr Fong Chee Yang and Mr Fong Mun 
Yung Gregory John (both formerly of 
Beston Law LLP) have commenced 
practice under the name and style of Fong 
& Fong LLC on 12 January 2015 at the 
following address and contact numbers:
150 South Bridge Road
#02-05 Fook Hai Building
Singapore 058727
Tel: 6532 2366
Fax: 6532 2367
E-mail: legal@fongllc.com
Website: www.fongllc.com
Mr Leong Kum Kwok (formerly of Bih Li 
& Lee) has commenced practice under the 
name and style of Leong Kum Kwok Law 
Practice LLC on 12 January 2015 at the 
following address and contact numbers:
1 Coleman Street
#05-15 The Adelphi
Singapore 179803
E-mail: kkleong2001g@gmail.com
Mr Anthony Tan Lay Tiong and Mr Tan 
Lay Pheng (both formerly of Tan Andrea 
Seah & Partners) have commenced 
practice under the name and style of AT 
Law Practice LLP on 22 January 2015 
at the following address and contact 
numbers:
480 Lorong 6 Toa Payoh
#07-03 HDB Hub East Wing 
Singapore 310480
Tel: 6478 6210
Fax: 6325 6501
E-mail: anthony@tas-partners.com
Mr Deepak Natverlal (formerly of Maximus 
Law LLC) has commenced practice under 
the name and style of Crown Juris Law 
LLC on 23 January 2015 at the following 
address and contact numbers:
150 South Bridge Road
#02-11 Fook Hai Building
Singapore 058727
Tel: 6532 0416
Fax: 6532 0459
E-mail: info@crownjurislaw.com
Website: www.crownjurislaw.com
Dissolution of Law Practices
The law practice of Beston Law LLP 
dissolved on 11 January 2015. 
Outstanding matters of the former law 
practice of Beston Law LLP have, with 
effect from 12 January 2015, been taken 
over by:
Fong & Fong LLC
150 South Bridge Road
#02-05 Fook Hai Building
Singapore 058727
Tel: 6532 2366
Fax: 6532 2367
E-mail: legal@fongllc.com
Website: www.fongllc.com
Conversion of Law Practices
Eugene Thuraisingam has converted 
to a limited liability partnership, Eugene 
Thuraisingam LLP, on 13 January 2015 
and is operating at the following address 
and contact numbers:
One Phillip Street 
#03-02
Singapore 048692
Tel: 6557 2436
Fax: 6557 2437
E-mail: eugene@thuraisingam.com
Website: www.thuraisingam.com
The following are Partners of Eugene 
Thuraisingam LLP: Mr Eugene 
Thuraisingam, Mr Nakoorsha Bin Abdul 
Kadir and Mr Cheong Jun Ming Mervyn 
(all formerly of Eugene Thuraisingam).
Change of Law Practices’ Addresses
Grays LLC
141 Cecil Street
#05-00 Tung Ann Association Building
Singapore 069541
Tel: 6333 3007
Fax: 6333 3008
(wef 15 December 2014)
JC Law Asia LLC
16 Raffl es Quay 
#40-01B Hong Leong Building
Singapore 048581
T: 6222 8338
F: 6225 9386
E: offi ce@jclawasia.com
(wef 29 October 2014)
SL Tan & Co
133 New Bridge Road
#16-06 
Singapore 059413
Tel: 6538 4251
Fax: 6538 5414
(wef 19 January 2015) 
Syed Yahya & Partners 
228 Changi Road 
#02-01 Icon @ Changi 
Singapore 419741
Tel: 6447 3455
Fax: 6447 4454
E-mail: syplaw@singnet.com.sg
(wef 16 January 2015)
Jenny Lai & Co
101A Upper Cross Street
#08-20 People's Park Centre
Singapore 058358
Tel: 6227 7347
Fax: 6225 2251
E-mail: jlcosg@gmail.com
(wef 14 January 2015)
Pinnacle Law LLC
Branch Offi ce
24 Peck Seah Street 
#06-02 Nehsons Building 
Singapore 079314
(wef 15 January 2015) 
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To place a notice in this section, please write to the Publications Department at The Law Society of Singapore, 39 South Bridge Road, Singapore 058673, Fax: 6533 5700, 
with the deceased’s particulars, a copy of the death certifi cate and cheque payment of S$85.60 per notice made in favour of ‘The Law Society of Singapore‘. All 
submissions must reach us by the 5th day of the preceding month.
Information on Wills
Name of Deceased (Sex)
NRIC
Date of Death
Last Known Address Solicitors/Contact Person Reference
Goh Miang Heng (M)
S1566865B
22 December 2014
Blk 151 Tampines Street 12
#02-08
Singapore 521151
Yeo & Associates LLC
6220 3400
YPT/Misc2015/Lee 
Meow Swang
Wong Mei Lin@Wong Ah Yat (F)
S0407875F
24 December 2014
22 Grove Crescent
Singapore 279158
Rajah & Tann Singapore 
LLP
6232 0704
GVG/VMN/shn
MC Intyre Gloria (F)
S0729675D
15 July 2013
51 Lorong Stangee
Singapore 425042
Drew & Napier LLC
6531 2447
JLTL/393861
Anna Wong Ann Naa (F)
S6912165I
3 October 2014
Blk 764 Choa Chu Kang North 5 
#06-277
Singapore 680764
Summit Law Corporation
6597 8363
201410653/11
Toh Hno Soi (M)
S0222889J
23 December 2014
Blk 433 Bukit Panjang Ring Road
#03-617
Singapore 670433
P. Tan & Company
6538 5263
PT/Probate/5384.15
Sinay Bin Hachan (M)
S0534986I
18 May 2014
Blk 701B Yishun Avenue 5
#10-610
Singapore 762701
Jayne Wong Advocates & 
Solicitors
6466 9221
JW/ll/81847/LA
Tan Ah Chee (F)
S2081816F
13 January 2015
Blk 178 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 4
#11-959 
Singapore 560178
Hoh Law Corporation
6553 5186
AO/P20047.15/vt
Tan Chui Chui (F)
S1272518C
15 January 2012
Blk 360C Admiralty Drive
#02-48
Singapore 753360
Hoh Law Corporation
6553 5186
AO/P20050.15/vt
Lim Sock Koon (F)
S0271539B
20 October 2014
Blk 96 Commonweath Crescent
#10-04
Singapore 140096
Tng Soon Chye & Co
6438 3133
TSC.2965.Prob.2014-
ak
Karthik Srinivasan (M)
Indian Passport: Z2377947
19 December 2014
New 36 Sivaji Street 
T Nagar, Chennai 600017
India
Tan Leroy & Chandra
6429 0788
LST/K/7158/2015/c
Sim Kern Teck (M)
S0291390I
7 January 2015
Blk 82 Tiong Poh Road
#02-11
Singapore 160082
Allen & Gledhill LLP 
6890 7856
DDN/ptc/1015001051
56
Notices
Singapore Law Gazette   February 2015
Information on Wills
These are a small selection of our current vacancies. If you require further details or wish to have a 
conﬁdential discussion about your career, market trends, or would like salary information then please 
contact one of our consultants in Singapore (EA Licence: 07C5776):
Lucy Twomey or Jean Teh on +65 6557 4163. 
To email your details in conﬁdence then please contact us on legal.sg@alsrecruit.com.
(852) 2920 9100
als@alsrecruit.com
Hong Kong Singapore
(65) 6557 4163
singapore@alsrecruit.com
Beijing
(86) 10 6567 8728
beijing@alsrecruit.com
Shanghai
(86) 21 6372 1058
shanghai@alsrecruit.com
REGULATORY PARTNER        Singapore             8+ PQE
 
Major local law firm seeks a senior Singapore qualified lawyer to join their 
Regulatory team as a partner to grow the existing practice. The ideal candidate 
will have strong experience in advising on a variety of regulatory and 
compliance issues. Candidates from financial institutions as well as top tier 
law firms will be well regarded. (SLG 11629)
SENIOR BANKING ASSOCIATE           Singapore          6-10 PQE
This leading international law firm is seeking a senior Singapore qualified 
banking lawyer to join its highly regarded banking and finance team. Senior 
experience in international and cross-border transactions as well as general 
advisory matters gained in a top tier firm will be essential. (SLG 1139)
TMT/IT ASSOCIATE                 Singapore            3-5 PQE
An international law firm with a strong reputation in technology is seeking a 
mid-level associate. This role will be exposed to a wide variety of high profile 
corporate commercial IT / TMT work. Candidates must have international 
experience in general corporate and transactional work with a TMT or 
outsourcing focus. (SLG 11536)
DISPUTES ASSOCIATE         Singapore        NQ-3 PQE    
This large global law firm is seeking junior disputes lawyers with excellent 
academics and previous training/work experience in a top tier local or 
international law firm. Expertise in financial services and related 
investigations will be well regarded. (SLG 11643)
ASSET FINANCE (SHIPPING) 
ASSOCIATE       Singapore        NQ-3 PQE  
A top tier international law firm is seeking a junior asset finance lawyer, ideally 
with experience in shipping. Candidates with strong project finance experience, 
looking to broaden their practice, will also be considered for this role. 
(SLG 11691)
BANKING ASSOCIATE        Singapore         NQ-3 PQE 
This international law firm is looking for an enthusiastic NQ or junior lawyer 
to join its dynamic banking practice. This will be a great role for learning the 
ropes in a friendly and collaborative team with exposure to broad banking and 
finance matters. (SLG 11720)
SENIOR M&A COUNSEL Singapore                        15-18 PQE 
A major investment firm with global interests across various sectors is looking 
for a senior lawyer to provide legal advice on a broad range of high profile 
corporate transactions including capital raising work, private and public 
M&A. Candidate must be a Singapore qualified lawyer with strong 
transactional cross-border M&A experience. (SLG 10679) 
REGIONAL COMPLIANCE 
AND RISK  Singapore                        12-15 PQE 
Global leader in insurance consulting is looking for a senior risk and 
compliance officer to oversee their compliance function across APAC. 
Candidates with strong familiarity in FCPA, Anti-Bribery act and experience 
dealing with the regulators would be preferred. (SLG 11701) 
SENIOR COUNSEL     Singapore                 9-13 PQE             
 
Major leading property company seeks to hire a senior counsel to assist with 
their investments across the Asia region. The lawyer will be responsible for 
working with the business team on fund raising, M&A and joint venture 
projects across the region. (SLG 11593) 
M&A COUNSEL Singapore                 7-12 PQE             
 
A global investment firm is seeking to hire a Singapore qualified lawyer with 
strong transactional cross border M&A experience. Candidates with 
experience in M&A transactions in China are preferred for this position. 
 (SLG 10678) 
 
LEGAL COUNSEL            Singapore                            3-7 PQE
Major US listed company in the IT space is seeking to hire a lawyer to support its 
commercial sales business across the Asia region. This role will focus on a broad 
range of commercial and customer service related contracts. (SLG 11732)
 
FINANCE COUNSEL              Singapore                            3-5 PQE
A leading regional bank is looking for a legal counsel to provide legal support to its 
Global Market business across the Asia region.  Candidates with broad range of 
banking, finance and/or capital markets experience gained from top tier law firms 
will be considered. (SLG 10609)
In-HousePrivate Practice
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Contracting Counsel (8+ PQE), Singapore
A leading provider of IT and consulting services seeks a 
highly motivated and energetic lawyer to join their legal 
team in Singapore, to provide legal advice and support 
to the company’s commercial projects in South East 
Asia. Primary responsibilities include reviewing, drafting 
and negotiating legal documentation for complex 
contracts. The successful candidate should have 
Singapore work experience and good transactional 
experience in IT - those familiar with systems integration, 
outsourcing, management consulting, cloud, analytics 
will have an edge. You should also be an independent 
worker with keen commercial acumen. [S19700]
Legal Counsel (5-8 PQE), Singapore
The financial arm of an international MNC, is looking to 
hire a 5-8 PQE lawyer, to provide legal support on their 
financing products, services and solutions. This position is 
based in Singapore and will cover the South East Asia 
region. The ideal candidate should be a good team 
player and have strong contract drafting skills; prior 
banking experience is good-to-have but not a strict 
prerequisite. Some travel is anticipated. [S37718]
Shipping Counsel (4-7 PQE), Singapore
Our client, a leading Fortune 500 company, is hiring a 
shipping/freight lawyer to join their well-established legal 
team. You must have good experience in dry and wet 
shipping, commercial arrangements for the shipping of 
energy and resources, and related disputes within the 
international commodities trading context, and should 
ideally be Singapore-qualified. The successful candidate 
can expect excellent career progression in a dynamic 
and fast-paced organisation. [S36001]
Legal Counsel (2-4 PQE), Singapore
Leading corporate secretarial company seeks a legal 
counsel to assist in the full spectrum of in-house legal and 
compliance matters. The broad spectrum of tasks will 
provide exciting learning opportunities as well as a great 
training platform for upward progression. Responsibilities 
entail drafting and reviewing a wide variety of legal            
and commercial agreements including business and 
operational contracts, IP/IT contracts, M&A agreements 
among others. Law degree from a recognized university 
and some prior experience working with a law firm or as an 
in-house legal counsel will hold you in good stead. [S38828]
Trust & Compliance Officer (10-14 PQE), 
Bengaluru, India
US IT MNC seeks a lawyer to be tasked with the 
responsibility of driving corporate compliance programs 
and initiatives throughout India and South Asia; you            
will maintain appropriate processes and operating 
mechanisms to meet policy compliance & regulatory 
responsibilities; identify key critical-to-compliance needs; 
determine risks and improve controls; coordinate with         
the business and provide training support. Candidates   
with at least 10 years’ experience in directing/leading 
compliance required. Strong interpersonal skills, the ability 
to interface with cross-functional teams, management 
and regulators/regulatory agencies with excellent written 
and oral communication skills are advantageous. [S37127]
Tax Partner (6+ PQE), Singapore
This is an exciting opportunity for a tax lawyer to join a 
leading firm in Singapore with a strong regional  
presence and grow their tax practice. The successful 
candidate will advise a pool of existing clients, both 
private and corporate, on a range of tax matters 
including issues relating to local and cross-border 
transactions, structuring and planning services, and 
disputes with IRAS. Interested candidates must be 
Singapore-qualified and have at least 6 years tax 
experience gained in a reputable law firm. [S37713]
Banking & Finance Senior Associate (6-10 PQE), 
Singapore  
A large international law firm, is seeking a senior 
associate to join the firm's Banking & Finance team. This 
team is one of the most well regarded corporate finance 
practices in the region. The practice acts for both 
borrowers and lenders across a broad range of local 
and cross-border transactions including syndicated and 
bi-lateral loans, securitized debt, as well as asset and 
project financing matters. The ideal candidate would be 
Singapore called with 6-10 years of prior experience with 
a top-ranked local or international Banking & Finance 
practice. Extensive experience leading multi-party, 
cross-border transactions would be looked upon highly 
favourably. [S31991]
Employment Lawyer (5-10 PQE), Singapore
A boutique international firm, seeks a mid-level 
employment lawyer to expand its employment     
advisory practice to the firm's Singapore office. The   
ideal candidate will be common law qualified, and 
have regional exposure to employment and labour    
issues in Australia and ASEAN. The role will be responsible 
for working with team members in Europe to support 
existing clients, as well as develop the firm's practice in 
Singapore. The candidate must be highly motivated, 
entrepreneurial, capable of working autonomously, and 
excited about the opportunity to build a regional 
practice. [S18800]
Corporate Associate (3-6 PQE), Singapore
A well regarded local law firm is seeking a senior 
associate to join the firm's corporate department. The 
role will encompass M&A and general corporate and 
corporate finance work for domestic and international 
clients throughout the region and Singapore. 
Candidates with extensive finance, capital markets or 
M&A experience are welcome to apply. Preference for 
candidates that are called to the Singapore bar. 
[S38826]
Derivatives Lawyer (2-6 PQE), Hong Kong
A top-tier international law firm is seeking a mid-level 
Financial Regulatory lawyer to join the firm's Hong Kong 
office. The ideal candidate should have a broad range 
of experience in transactional and regulatory advisory 
related to financial products with particular knowledge 
of derivatives and other structured products. Applicants 
should also be HK or Common Law qualified, and 
Chinese language skills are preferred, but not required. 
[S35614]
IN-HOUSE
We are looking!  If you possess a law degree, have about 3-5 PQE and are looking for a stimulating career, come talk 
to us!  You will be trained by experienced legal recruitment specialists who believe in working with a high level of 
integrity and professionalism.  As we give each of our Recruitment Consultants the opportunity for personal and 
professional growth, you will be exposed to the full cycle of the recruitment process, from business development to 
candidate sourcing and placement.  Legal Labs offers an opportunity to build a recruitment career in an outfit that 
values open communication, hard work and ethical business conduct.  In return, we will recognise your contribution to 
our continued growth in the region. [S37716]
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Private Practice Roles
Electronic Banking  .  Singapore
??????? ???????????? ???? ?? ??????????? ???????? ???????????? ??????????? ????????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????? 
Legal Tax Advisor  .  Singapore
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
?? ??????? ??????? ? ????????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ????? ???????? ?????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
???????????? ????????
Securities Services  .  Singapore
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
?????? ?????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????
Logistics  .  Singapore
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
???????????? ????????
Pharmaceutical  .  Singapore
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????
Aviation  .  Singapore
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????????????? ?????????????? ????????
???????????? ????????
Shipping  .  Singapore
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
???????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????????
???????????? ??????????
Hospitality  .  Singapore
?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
??? ???? ????????????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ???????? ????? ????? ????????????
??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????? 
Asset Finance  .  Singapore
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ?????????? 
Corporate  .  Singapore
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????
International Arbitation  .  Singapore
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????
TMT  .  Singapore
??????? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ?????????? ??? ??????????
???????? ???????? ?????????? ?? ???????? ????????? ????? ???? ????? ??????? ?? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????
Litigation  .  Singapore
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ????????
Regulatory .  Singapore
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ?????????? ??????????? ????????? ????? ????????? ??????? ??????????????????? ??????
?????????????????????? ?????????????? ??????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????
Projects  .  Singapore
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????
Corporate  .  Singapore
????? ???????? ????????????? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ????? ?? ???????????? ??????????????
????????? ?????? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ????? ???? ???????? ???
??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????? 
LEGAL RECRUITMENT 
FIRM OF THE YEAR 
SINGAPORE
YOUR PROFESSION
OUR PASSION
hays.com.sg
BANKING & FINANCE ASSOCIATE - INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM
A prominent global law ﬁrm is seeking a passionate mid-level ﬁnance 
associate to join its Singapore office. This role will involve extensive 
involvement in the drafting, negotiation and due diligence of a wide 
array of ﬁnance and project documents, as well as regularly attending 
client meetings. An ideal role for an ambitious associate seeking to 
take the next step in their career with a global law ﬁrm. 
You must have between 4 to 6 years post qualiﬁcation experience 
and be called to the bar in Singapore or the United Kingdom. 
Experience working on ﬁnance transactions covering South East 
Asia is advantageous. You must be professional, knowledgeable and 
meticulous. Excellent academics are an added advantage.
LEGAL DIRECTOR - INVESTMENT COMPANY
A unique opportunity exists with a global investment company who 
is currently seeking a Legal Director based in Singapore. You will 
provide legal support on investment deals and institutional deals, as 
well as liaising with external counsel on speciﬁc investment matters, 
together with overseeing the work of directors in general legal and 
compliance. This is a fantastic opportunity for a senior lawyer seeking 
to establish themselves in a global investment company.
You will have between 8 to 20 years’ PQE with experience in 
transactional law, ideally specialising in public markets, corporate, 
funds, investments, banking or ﬁnancial services. You will ideally have 
both in-house and private practice experience, and currently be in 
a senior role. Top-tier or blue-chip experience on a global scale is 
essential, along with familiarity working on matters in Singapore.  
LEGAL COUNSEL - INSURANCE
A global insurance company is seeking a passionate legal counsel 
to join its energetic legal team in Singapore. This particular role 
will involve the provision of legal and regulatory advice to various 
business units, as well as drafting, negotiating and reviewing legal 
and commercial contracts on behalf of the organisation. 
You must have at least six years post qualiﬁcation experience and 
be qualiﬁed to practice in Singapore. An honours degree from a 
reputable Singapore university is also highly desirable, together with 
a strong commercial acumen, great negotiation skills and excellent 
interpersonal skills. This is a great opportunity for a driven lawyer to 
be part of a global business. 
Contact Armin Hosseinipour (Reg ID No. R1440509) at  
armin.hosseinipour@hays.com.sg or +65 6303 0725.
MOTIVATED CORPORATE ASSOCIATE
A strong local ﬁrm is seeking an Associate or Senior Associate to join 
their corporate team. At present they have three main areas of practice, 
being Corporate, litigation and intellectual property (IP). They are one of 
the main players in the intellectual property market and are known for 
their leading IP strategies. Their corporate team currently consists of two 
Partners and they are seeking a valued individual to join their expanding 
business. Reporting to one of the Corporate Partners you will be 
responsible for providing corporate and commercial support in a broad 
range of transactions with particular focus on intellectual property.
You must have a minimum of three years PQE and be called to the 
Singapore bar. As you will be working in a close knit team, you 
should have an adaptable personality and be prepared to work 
in a small team. Understanding of intellectual property will be 
highly advantageous however solid corporate experience will be 
most important. This is an excellent opportunity for an experience 
corporate lawyer seeking to develop in a growing practice.
EXPERIENCED PARALEGAL
A leading international law ﬁrm is seeking a Paralegal to support their 
capital markets and securities team. You will be working closely with 
the existing support team to ensure that the needs of the fee earners 
are fulﬁlled, including but not limited to engaging in legal research, 
reviewing agreements and ﬁling documentation.
You must have a bachelor degree from a reputable institution and a 
minimum of three years experience in a similar environment. Experience 
in capital markets, project ﬁnance or securities will be strongly favoured. 
This is a challenging opportunity for an experienced Paralegal. 
PASSIONATE IP ASSOCIATE/IP EXECUTIVE
One of the strongest IP teams in the market is expanding their team, 
seeking to bring on board either an IP Associate or IP Executive. You 
will be working as part of the portfolio management team, focusing on 
Trademark portfolio management. Experience in the industry is crucial, 
particularly experience in the Singapore or APAC region. You should 
have a solid understanding of Trademarks and ideally be called to the 
Singapore bar. Those that are not called to the Singapore bar will only 
be eligible for the Executive position. This is a great opportunity for 
someone that is seeking to be a part of a prestigious IP team.
Contact Judy Liu (Reg ID No. R1333115) at judy.liu@hays.com.sg  
or +65 6303 0725.
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